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THE MOVEMENT TO DECRIMINALIZE 
BORDER CROSSING 
INGRID V. EAGLY* 
Abstract: Should it be a crime to cross the border into the United States? This 
Article explores the growing resistance to the politics and practices of mass bor-
der criminalization. In doing so, it makes three central contributions. First, it dis-
sects the varied strands of the punitive practices of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, including policies of zero-tolerance prosecution for first-time unauthorized 
border crossers and enhanced punishments for those who reenter after deporta-
tion. Second, it traces how growing public awareness of the previously hidden 
practices occurring in Border Patrol holding cells and federal criminal courts 
along the Southwest border have sparked new and outspoken criticism of the il-
legal entry and reentry laws. These laws have resulted in the forced separation of 
families, interfered with the rights of asylum seekers, and fostered a racially seg-
regated and substandard court process. Third, this Article analyzes the nascent 
movement by immigrant rights groups, prominent politicians, and grassroots coa-
litions of community members to decriminalize border crossing by repealing 
Sections 1325 and 1326 of the immigration law that have punished unauthorized 
border crossing since 1929. Although critics maintain that such a legislative 
change would create so-called open borders, irregular entry would remain a civil 
violation of the immigration law and be handled by the civil deportation system. 
As this Article argues, the call to decriminalize border crossing exposes the ra-
cialized harm imposed by current policing practices and inspires discussion of 
additional reforms that would make the civil side of immigration law more hu-
mane and equitable.  
INTRODUCTION 
More immigrants were prosecuted for border crossing under the Obama 
administration than any prior presidency.1 In the last year of President Barack 
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Obama’s second term in office, immigration crime constituted a staggering 
forty-three percent of all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ).2 President Donald Trump nonetheless sought to outdo his predecessor. 
During his first month in office, President Trump issued a pair of Execu-
tive Orders on immigration enforcement that announced an unprecedented fo-
cus on criminally prosecuting migrants crossing the Southwest border.3 Then-
Attorney General Jefferson Sessions soon instructed U.S. Attorneys to demon-
strate a “renewed commitment” to making immigration crimes for illegal entry 
and reentry even “higher priorities.”4 Such an “updated” approach to charging 
criminal cases was necessary, according to the Attorney General, to “establish 
lawfulness in our immigration system” and to “accomplish the goal of deter-
ring first-time improper entrants.”5 Within the five federal district courts along 
the Southwest border, courtrooms began to overflow with defendants charged 
with unlawfully entering the United States. 
Most academic commentary to date regarding President Trump’s immi-
gration policies has focused on the administration’s ramped-up efforts to en-
force the civil immigration law.6 The civil immigration law refers to the body 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See infra Figure 2 and Table 1 (tracing the rise in misdemeanor and felony immigration crime 
prosecutions over President Barack Obama’s eight years in office); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Prose-
cuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1321–36, 1353 & fig.4 (2010) (discussing the increas-
ing focus on immigration crime under both President Obama and President George W. Bush). 
 2 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS tbls.D-4 & M-
2 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://
perma.cc/3CEP-PKXS] (enter table number in “search by table number,” select month, day, year of 
reporting period, and then select “apply”) (reporting that in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016, 
immigration crime constituted 47,962 out of 79,969 criminal cases disposed of by federal magistrate 
courts and 20,352 out of 77,318 criminal cases disposed of by federal district courts). 
 3 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the Unit-
ed States, § 11 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Interior Enforcement E.O.] (instructing the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and Attorney General to ensure that “adequate resources are devoted to the prose-
cution of criminal immigration offenses in the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8793, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, § 13 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
Border Security E.O.] (ordering the Attorney General to “take all appropriate steps to establish prose-
cution guidelines and allocate appropriate resources to ensure that Federal prosecutors accord a high 
priority to” immigration crimes along the southern border). 
 4 See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed. 
Prosecutors, Renewed Commitment to Immigration Enforcement 1 (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download [https://perma.cc/FM98-EXNC] (implementing 
President Donald Trump’s Executive Orders on interior immigration enforcement and border securi-
ty). 
 5 Id. at 1, 2. 
 6 For important examples of scholarship addressing President Trump’s civil immigration policies, 
see Lenni B. Benson, Administrative Chaos: Responding to Child Refugees—U.S. Immigration Pro-
cess in Crisis, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1288–89 (2018) (arguing that immigration court is the 
wrong forum to consider the protection needs of migrant children); Ming H. Chen, “Not a One-
Person Show”: Trump as Administrator-in-Chief of the Immigration Bureaucracy, 36 YALE J. ON 
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of statutes, rules, and precedents that formally govern who can enter the Unit-
ed States and the terms under which individuals may be removed.7 By compar-
ison, President Trump’s agenda to enforce the criminal immigration law has 
received scant scholarly attention.8 This Article advances the conversation by 
analyzing how the administration’s criminal immigration policies have shaped 
the on-the-ground practices of federal prosecutors during the Trump presiden-
cy. By exposing the mechanisms of the system that punishes border crossers, 
this Article also unearths something perhaps less expected: a mounting wave of 
resistance to the politics and practices of border criminalization. 
                                                                                                                           
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 21, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/not-a-one-person-show-trump-as-
administrator-in-chief-of-the-immigration-bureaucracy-by-ming-h-chen/ [https://perma.cc/8FX4-WTJA] 
(explaining how President Trump’s “travel ban” threatened prudential norms of coherence, consisten-
cy, and coordination); Kati L. Griffith & Shannon Gleeson, Trump’s ‘Immployment’ Law Agenda: 
Intensifying Employment-Based Enforcement and Un-Authorizing the Authorized, 48 SW. L. Rev. 475, 
480–91 (2019) (documenting how the Trump administration is intensifying reliance on workplace-
based enforcement tools such as raids); Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Contiguous Territories: The Expanded 
Use of “Expedited Removal” in the Trump Era, 33 MD. J. INT’L L. 268, 273–82 (2018) (analyzing 
legal challenges to President Trump’s proposed expansion of the power of expedited removal); Kari 
Hong, The Costs of Trumped-up Immigration Enforcement Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 119, 124–40, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HONG.38.symposium.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8YQP-Y9T6] (discussing the financial costs of the Trump administration’s 
heightened immigration enforcement measures); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in 
the Trump Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
611, 628–51 (2017) (outlining the civil enforcement components of the immigration-related Executive 
Orders issued during President Trump’s first weeks in office); Daniel Kanstroom, Expedited Removal 
and Due Process: “A Testing Crucible of Basic Principle” in the Time of Trump, 75 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1323, 1324–27 (2018) (raising concerns regarding the Trump administration’s planned expan-
sion of expedited removal); Nina Rabin, Searching for Humanitarian Discretion in Immigration En-
forcement: Reflections on a Year as an Immigration Attorney in the Trump Era, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
139, 141 (2019) (relying on case studies to show how the Trump administration has “rejected over-
sight and transparency regarding when favorable discretion is to be exercised” in the civil immigration 
system); Jayashri Srikantiah, Resistance and Immigrants’ Rights, 13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 5, 5–12 
(2017) (encouraging lawyers, law students, and community members to resist the anti-immigrant and 
racist Trump agenda by planning an immigrant rights advocacy agenda). 
 7 Of course, the formal civil and criminal immigration law is embedded within a broader informal 
system for regulating migration in the United States. For example, Eisha Jain, K-Sue Park, and Hiro-
shi Motomura have called attention to the many ways that the constant threat of deportation facilitates 
powerful indirect forms of participation by states, localities, and other actors in immigrant selection 
and exclusion. Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463 
(2019) (elucidating the array of actors, including local police and employers, that participate in the immi-
gration enforcement system); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
2037 (2008) (showing how states and cities work outside the formal immigration law to define the 
meaning of unlawful presence); K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878 
(2019) (exploring the role that “self deportation” plays as an “indirect mode of regulation” within the 
larger U.S. immigration system). 
 8 For two important exceptions, see Natasha Arnpriester, Trumping Asylum: Criminal Prosecu-
tions for “Illegal” Entry and Reentry Violate the Rights of Asylum Seekers, 45 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 3, 3–9 (2017), and Evan J. Criddle, The Case Against Prosecuting Refugees, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
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Since the law criminalizing unauthorized entry and reentry was first 
adopted in 1929,9 its enforcement has taken place largely in the shadows. To be 
sure, civil and human rights organizations have investigated and critiqued the 
mass prosecutions that exploded along the U.S.-Mexico border over the past 
two decades.10 Scholars have similarly warned of the overcriminalization of 
migrants,11 the subordination and racialization of immigrant groups caused by 
criminalization,12 and the questionable effectiveness and considerable expense 
of border prosecutions.13 Yet, the day-to-day practices associated with these 
cases had continued, hidden behind closed doors in overcrowded Border Patrol 
holding cells14 and border courts with no public audience.15 As a result, the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (“Any alien who hereaf-
ter enters the United States . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”). 
 10 See, e.g., JUDITH A. GREENE ET AL., INDEFENSIBLE: A DECADE OF MASS INCARCERATION OF 
MIGRANTS PROSECUTED FOR CROSSING THE BORDER (2016), https://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/
default/files/reports/indefensible_book_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EK5-MWXW]; JOANNA LYD-
GATE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, UNIV. OF CA-
LIF., BERKELEY LAW SCH., ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 3 
(2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3T35-ACUQ]; GRACE MENG, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING MIGRANTS INTO CRIMINALS: THE 
HARMFUL IMPACT OF US BORDER PROSECUTIONS (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/us0513_ForUpload_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNK3-K69R]. 
 11 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 613, 613–16 (2012); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprison-
ment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1449–51 (2015); Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: 
Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 56–61 (2009); 
David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 
157 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–79 (2006). 
 12 See, e.g., Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, Colorblindness, and 
the Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82, 82 (2016) 
(identifying “organizational practices and laws” that “converge to systemically criminalize and punish 
Latinos in the United States”); Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The 
Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993, 998 (2016) 
(discussing the disparate impact that results from deportation efforts focused on those who first enter 
the racially biased criminal justice system). 
 13 See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on Im-
migrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 550–75 (2004); Mary De Ming 
Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 1–7 (2007); Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Prosecution of Immigration 
Crimes, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 863, 863–65 (2015); Douglas Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-
entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 65 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Con-
vergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 105 (2012); Daniel I. Morales, Crimes 
of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1257–64 (2014); Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing 
Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 275 (2010). 
 14 In 2019, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
gained access to these Border Patrol holding cells and issued a scathing report urging DHS “to take 
immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding and prolonged detention of children and 
adults[.]” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., MANAGEMENT ALERT—DHS 
NEEDS TO ADDRESS DANGEROUS OVERCROWDING AMONG SINGLE ADULTS AT EL PASO DEL NORTE 
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criminalization of border crossing had sparked little mainstream public con-
cern or serious national policy discussion. 
This Article traces how the current administration’s aggressive public 
stance has moved border prosecution practices into public view and exposed 
federal officials to heightened scrutiny, moral condemnation, and legal chal-
lenge. Broad coalitions of community members, elected officials, clergy, legal 
experts, and media have come forward to denounce the administration’s prose-
cution scheme as nativist, immoral, and unlawful. Marking the building mo-
mentum to resist border criminalization, former Secretary of Housing and Ur-
ban Development Julián Castro made headlines at the opening debate of the 
2019 Democratic presidential primary when he challenged “every single can-
didate on this stage to support the repeal of Section 1325,”16 the section of the 
federal criminal code that makes unlawful entry into the United States a mis-
demeanor punishable by up to six months in jail.17 Other Democratic presiden-
tial contenders joined in the call to decriminalize border crossing.18 At the end 
of 2019, a historic bill (called the New Way Forward Act) was introduced in 
the U.S. Congress proposing to do just that: end border crossing prosecutions 
by repealing the illegal entry and reentry laws.19 
This Article interrogates the idea of border decriminalization as a possible 
avenue for immigration reform. It does so by first examining how President 
Trump’s Executive Orders and related policy statements on immigration en-
forcement have influenced on-the-ground practices in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
and federal courts. As Part I develops, the most significant shift in policy was 
the adoption of a “zero-tolerance” approach by which prosecutors placed an 
                                                                                                                           
PROCESSING CENTER (REDACTED), OIG-19-46 (May 30, 2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/assets/2019-05/OIG-19-46-May19.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AA-ACMU]. 
 15 Jocelyn Simonson has pointed out the important role that local community members who at-
tend urban criminal courts play in holding the criminal justice system accountable. Jocelyn Simonson, 
The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014). With crimes of 
migration playing out in federal border courts, however, there is rarely a public audience of communi-
ty members. 
 16 Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debates, Night 1, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/democratic-debate-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/3HFC-
WFKG] [hereinafter Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debates, Night 1]. 
 17 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018). 
 18 See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text. 
 19 New Way Forward Act, H.R. 5383, Title VI, Decriminalize Migration, § 601 (2019). The New 
Way Forward Act would repeal the illegal entry and reentry laws, and also achieve a number of other 
reforms in the immigration system, including ending mandatory detention and summary forms of 
removal for immigrants with criminal convictions. See Press Release, Representatives García, Press-
ley, Jayapal and Bass Introduce the New Way Forward Act to Fight the Criminalization of Immigrants 
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://chuygarcia.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-garc-pressley-
jayapal-and-bass-introduce-new-way-forward-act [https://perma.cc/E8W4-B6GZ] [hereinafter Press 
Release: New Way Forward Act]. 
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increasing number of border crossers in mass federal court proceedings known 
as “Operation Streamline.”20 Zero tolerance abandoned prior commitments to 
exercising prosecutorial discretion that funneled most first-time border entrants 
into the civil immigration system.21 
Part II scrutinizes three controversial aspects of the administration’s zero-
tolerance policy that have stoked the national debate over the propriety of us-
ing the criminal justice system to punish border crossers. First, ending prosecu-
torial discretion meant that even parents traveling with young children could 
be prosecuted, resulting in the tragic separation of these parents from their 
children.22 As Part II develops, the visible and heart-wrenching forced separa-
tions of families activated individuals across the political spectrum to question 
whether the government’s interest in petty law violations should supersede its 
moral obligation to promote family unity and the best interests of children. 
Second, zero tolerance meant that even vulnerable asylum seekers were swept 
into criminal courtrooms as they fled violent circumstances.23 These alarming 
prosecutions launched a deeper evaluation of the propriety of using the crimi-
nal law against migrants arriving in search of refuge. Third, insistence on zero 
tolerance expanded the Operation Streamline program to the federal court in 
San Diego where it was met with a series of robust legal challenges.24 Part II 
tells the story of how federal public defenders have pulled back the curtain on 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. Although the Trump administration has claimed 
that “zero tolerance” means that every border crosser would be prosecuted, total prosecutions have not 
come close to the number of border apprehensions. For example, in fiscal year 2018 the DOJ obtained 
80,117 convictions in the Streamline program, but the U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported 
521,090 southwest border apprehensions. Compare Figure 2, infra, with Southwest Border Migration 
FY2018, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/
fy-2018 [https://perma.cc/QX4Q-RGG4]. 
 22 See infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. In focusing on the policy of family separation 
as executed by the Trump administration against migrants, I do not mean to suggest that family sepa-
ration is isolated within the context of border prosecution. Rather, as Stephen Lee has argued, “the 
principle of ‘family separation’ pervasively defines our entire immigration system,” as families are 
torn apart through a range of types of enforcement. Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2319 (2020); see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., THE U.S. GOVERN-
MENT’S SYSTEMATIC SEPARATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 1 (2018), https://immigrantjustice.
org/sites/default/files/content-type/research-item/documents/2018-10/NIJC-policy-brief_family-
separation-Oct2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78D-9CYS] (arguing that family separation is a “central 
component of U.S. immigration policy—at the border, in our communities, and in the discriminatory 
policies that determine who can and cannot immigrate”). The criminal legal system also imposes 
family separation on thousands of citizens each day. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Family Separation: It’s 
a Problem for U.S. Citizens, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/
us/family-separation-americans-prison-jail.html [https://perma.cc/A657-MK4G]. 
 23 See infra notes 149–154 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 189–219 and accompanying text. 
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this racially segregated and subpar court system that fails the basic constitu-
tional and decency standards demanded of federal courts. 
Family separation, the prosecution of asylum seekers, and courtrooms 
that erode due process have kindled a growing movement that questions the 
legitimacy of border criminalization. Greater public awareness and grassroots 
mobilization has shifted the standard debate from one about how best to exer-
cise prosecutorial discretion to one that interrogates the propriety of a criminal 
law that has enabled such human suffering. Part III outlines the proposal con-
tained in the New Way Forward Act to end these prosecutions once and for all 
by repealing the laws criminalizing illegal entry and reentry. Repeal would not 
mean open borders, but rather would center the formal regulation of migration 
within the civil immigration system. Herein lies an important lesson of the de-
criminalization movement: by opening space to imagine the civil immigration 
system severed from its criminal counterpart, decriminalization invites explo-
ration of how the civil law regulating migration might evolve in a post-
prosecution era. Looking forward to these additional civil reforms is necessary 
to ensure that the systemic issues now occurring in the criminal legal system 
are not simply replicated within the existing machinery of the civil enforce-
ment system. Part III begins that essential dialog by suggesting what such 
changes might look like. Innovations could include updating the registry date 
to allow more recent entrants to apply for lawful permanent resident status, 
expanding the availability of discretionary relief from deportation, and recali-
brating civil removal to encompass intermediate sanctions short of deportation. 
I. IMMIGRATION PROSECUTION IN THE TRUMP ERA 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to outline the basic structure of migrant 
criminalization on the border. Under the federal criminal law adopted by the 
U.S. Congress, it is a misdemeanor to enter the United States without permis-
sion.25 Based on the federal code section where it is found, this misdemeanor 
crime of first-time improper entry is often referred to as “illegal entry” or 
“Section 1325.” Illegal entry is punishable by up to six months of incarcera-
tion,26 although judges most often sentence defendants who plead guilty to a 
sentence of time served.27 Because these illegal entry cases are petty misde-
                                                                                                                           
 25 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Reporters for USA Today inspected 2,598 written judgments in illegal entry cases filed in the 
summer of 2018 and found that judges issued “time served” sentences in nearly 70% of cases and 
probation in 13% of cases. Brad Heath, Trump Administration’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ Border Prosecu-
tions Led to Time Served, $10 Fees, USA TODAY (June 21, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2018/06/21/trumps-zero-tolerance-border-prosecutions-led-time-served-and-10-fee/722237002/ 
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meanors, they typically proceed in courts presided over by U.S. magistrate 
judges.28 After completion of the criminal process, migrants are transferred to 
the civil immigration system for deportation proceedings. 
The federal law also makes it a felony to reenter the United States without 
permission after deportation.29 This felony of reentry after deportation is also 
referred to as “illegal reentry” or “Section 1326.” As felonies, reentry cases 
proceed before U.S. district court judges and are punishable by up to twenty 
years in prison, depending on the severity of the individual’s prior criminal 
record.30 Sentencing in reentry cases is informed by the rules set forth in the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, as well as by the discretionary sentencing factors 
set forth in the U.S. Code.31 
Federal prosecutors in ninety-three regional U.S. Attorneys’ Offices pros-
ecute immigration crimes, under the umbrella of the DOJ.32 This structure, led 
by the U.S. Attorney General, means that the President and his administration 
have direct authority over how criminal immigration enforcement proceeds in 
practice. Across presidential administrations, the executive branch makes im-
portant decisions about how to treat border crossers—including whether to file 
criminal charges and, if so, what type of criminal sentence to seek.33 
The lion’s share of federal immigration convictions occur in the five fed-
eral judicial districts along the Southwest border of the United States. These 
districts are the Southern District of California, the District of Arizona, the 
District of New Mexico, and the Western and Southern Districts of Texas (Fig-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/39DD-BVE5]. Time served refers to the length of time that the individual has been 
held in pretrial detention. Id. 
 28 U.S. magistrate judges are appointed to the court through a merit selection process. See Peter 
G. McCabe, A Guide to the Federal Magistrate Judges System (Oct. 2016), https://www.fedbar.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper-2016-pdf-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPS-KMN9]. Magis-
trate judges may handle petty offense cases with possible sentences of six months or less without 
requiring the consent of the defendant. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(3)(A) (“A magistrate judge 
may take the defendant’s plea in a petty offense case.”). 
 29 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 
 30 Id. § 1326(b). 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (imposition of sentence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
233–34 (2005) (instructing federal judges to consult a wide range of sentencing factors and to not treat 
the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated by 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
 32 See Offices of the United States Attorneys, Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://ww.justice.
gov/usao/mission [https://perma.cc/L7KV-U6AU]. 
 33 See generally Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 823–29 (2017) (outlining the important role that the executive branch plays in 
shaping federal criminal law practices such as charging and sentencing). In the parallel context of civil 
immigration law, Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have shown how the President has considerable 
power over civil enforcement decisions. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009). 
1976 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1967 
ure 1).34 Each of these districts is headed by a local U.S. Attorney who is nom-
inated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.35 
Figure 1. Federal Court Districts on Southwest Border of the United States36 
 
Together, illegal entry and reentry are the most prosecuted crimes in fed-
eral courts today. In fiscal year 2019, 59% of all cases terminated in magistrate 
and district courts in the United States were immigration crimes, primarily il-
                                                                                                                           
 34 As Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts Jr. noted in his annual review of the federal 
judiciary, the southwestern border districts received 78% of the new filings for immigration crime in 
2018. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS JR., 2018 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 14 
(2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2018year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6DE3-FMYA]. 
 35 For example, President Trump nominated Ryan Patrick, a former Harris County District Attorney, 
to the post of U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas. See Meet the U.S. Attorney Ryan K. Pat-
rick, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/meet-us-attorney [https://perma.cc/
NVQ5-BR5T]. 
 36 Figure 1 depicts the five federal district court jurisdictions with the largest volume of immigra-
tion cases in fiscal year 2018. The District of Arizona and the District of New Mexico both cover the 
entire state. The Southern and Western Districts of Texas cover the Texas borderlands, while two 
additional districts (Northern and Eastern) cover the rest of the state. The Southern District of Califor-
nia covers the smallest geographic ground, including only the counties of San Diego and Imperial, 
California. Counties included in each district were obtained from the Public Access to Court Electron-
ic Records (PACER) system of the U.S. Courts. See County/District Locators, PACER, https://www.
pacer.gov/psco/cgi-bin/county.pl [https://perma.cc/ZBZ3-7REL] (select county from drop-down menu 
of “search for all counties in a district” and select “submit”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 5 (2018) (setting out 
the geographic boundaries of the federal judicial districts). 
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legal entry and reentry.37 In the five border districts, the caseloads of U.S. At-
torneys are almost exclusively focused on immigration. For example, in 2019, 
75% of all district court cases filed in the Southern District of Texas were for 
immigration crime.38 In the District of New Mexico, 80% of all district court 
cases filed in 2019 were for immigration crime.39 
The remainder of Part I sets forth the border prosecution policies articu-
lated during the Trump presidency. It begins by summarizing the formal poli-
cies announced in the President’s Executive Orders, government documents, 
and statements by government officials. Next, this Part introduces the two 
main pillars of the DOJ’s border crime policy under President Trump, zero tol-
erance for Section 1325 violations and enhanced punishment for Section 1326 
violations. 
A. Executive Orders on Immigration Crime 
Despite the fact that border apprehensions had reached all-time lows,40 
President Donald Trump made border enforcement a central talking point dur-
ing his presidential bid. On the campaign trail, he sought to garner support for 
his punitive immigration proposals by linking Mexican and Central American 
migration to crime. For instance, in the rally where he announced his run for 
President, he explicitly tied Mexican migration to crime: “When Mexico sends 
its people, they’re not sending their best . . . . They’re sending people that have 
lots of problems . . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists.”41 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Across both the magistrate and district courts, in fiscal year 2019 immigration crimes constitut-
ed 121,589 out of 206,448 criminal cases terminated. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
supra note 2, tbls.D-4 & M-2 (Sept. 30, 2019). 
 38 In 2019, immigration crimes constituted 7,018 out of 9,409 cases filed in the district court for 
the Southern District of Texas. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2, tbl.D-3 (Sept. 
30, 2019). 
 39 Immigration crimes constituted 3,573 out of 4,454 new district court cases filed in the District 
of New Mexico in 2019. Id. 
 40 See U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH (2020), https://
www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jan/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Monthl
y%20Apprehensions%20%28FY%202000%20-%20FY%202019%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8LH-
AUWY] (reporting Southwest border apprehensions by fiscal year and showing a decline from 
1,643,679 in 2000 to only 303,916 in 2017). A 2018 study by the Vera Institute for Justice concluded 
that there was “no evidence to support the conclusion that Operation Streamline succeeded in deter-
ring unauthorized border crossings, nor that it had any effect whatsoever on immigrants’ decisions to 
come to the United States.” MICHAEL CORRADINI ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OPERATION 
STREAMLINE: NO EVIDENCE THAT CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DETERS MIGRATION (June 2018), https://
storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/operation-streamline/legacy_down
loads/operation_streamline-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6UR-CHQP]. 
 41 Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult [https://perma.cc/U9QW-XLV6]. 
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Immediately upon taking office, President Trump signed two Executive 
Orders on immigration: one on interior enforcement and the other on border 
security.42 The interior-focused Executive Order announced a massive en-
forcement expansion within the borders of the United States, directing federal 
agencies to employ “all lawful means” to execute the country’s immigration 
laws against “all removable aliens.”43 The border-focused Executive Order 
directed federal agencies “to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation’s 
southern border, to prevent further illegal immigration into the United States, 
and to repatriate illegal aliens swiftly, consistently, and humanely.”44 
Both Executive Orders included clear language prioritizing the use of the 
federal criminal law to punish border crossers. Section 11 of the interior en-
forcement Executive Order declared: “The Attorney General and the Secretary 
shall work together to develop and implement a program that ensures that ade-
quate resources are devoted to the prosecution of criminal immigration offens-
es in the United States.”45 Section 13 of the border security Executive Order 
instructed the Attorney General to “take all appropriate steps to establish pros-
ecution guidelines and allocate appropriate resources to ensure that Federal 
prosecutors accord a high priority to prosecutions of offenses having a nexus to 
the southern border.”46 To further these goals, President Trump announced that 
he would support the hiring of an additional ten-thousand immigration offic-
ers.47 
In the months that followed the President’s Executive Orders, members of 
the administration took steps to implement his prosecutorial agenda. On Feb-
ruary 20, 2017, then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly authored two 
detailed memoranda, one on interior enforcement and the other on border secu-
rity. Secretary Kelly’s interior enforcement memorandum clarified that all De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel “have full authority . . . to 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See generally Interior Enforcement E.O., supra note 3; Border Security E.O., supra note 3. 
Two days after he issued Executive Orders on interior enforcement and border security, President 
Trump issued a third Executive Order, often referred to as the “Muslim ban” or “travel ban.” Exec. 
Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States, § 5(a) (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 43 Interior Enforcement E.O., supra note 3, § 4. 
 44 Border Security E.O., supra note 3, § 1. 
 45 Interior Enforcement E.O., supra note 3, § 11. 
 46 Border Security E.O., supra note 3, § 13. 
 47 Interior Enforcement E.O., supra note 3, § 7 (stating that funding for immigration enforcement 
will increase); see also Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws 
to Serve the National Interest 5 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XTV4-44VT] (instructing “all appropriate action to expeditiously hire 10,000 agents and 
officers”). 
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refer appropriate cases for criminal prosecution.”48 Similarly, Secretary Kelly’s 
border security memorandum underscored that the agency would “prioritiz[e] 
criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses committed at the border.”49 
More detailed information on the administration’s ramp-up of criminal 
prosecutions at the border soon followed from the DOJ. On April 11, 2017, 
Attorney General Sessions delivered a public statement in Nogales, Arizona. 
Standing before U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel, Sessions de-
clared: “For those that continue to seek improper and illegal entry into this 
country, be forewarned: This is a new era. This is the Trump era. The lawless-
ness, the abdication of the duty to enforce our immigration laws, and the catch-
and-release practices of old are over.”50 
 On the same day as his Nogales speech, Sessions wrote a memorandum to 
all federal prosecutors urging them to “increase [their] efforts” to make “immi-
gration offenses higher priorities.”51 The Attorney General ordered the U.S. 
Attorney for each Southwest border district to create a set of “guidelines” that 
“aim to accomplish the goal of deterring first-time improper entrants.”52 In 
addition, each border district was instructed to designate a “Border Security 
Coordinator” to oversee the investigation and prosecution of illegal entry and 
reentry, maintain statistics regarding these cases, and attend immigration-
specific training programs.53 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Memorandum from John Kelly, supra note 47, at 4. 
 49 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al., Implementing the President’s Border Security 
and Immigration Enforcement Improvement Priorities 11 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-
Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/79GW-G66X] [hereinafter Border Security 
Implementation Memo] (claiming that “[t]he surge of illegal immigration at the southern border has 
produced a significant increase in organized criminal activity in the border region”). 
 50 Alan Neuhauser, Sessions Enhances Criminal Penalties for Immigration Violations: “This Is 
the Trump Era,” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/Articles/2017-04-11/sessions-mandates-felony-prosecutions-for-immigration-violations [https://
perma.cc/Y5H6-L72U]. 
 51 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 4, at 1. The Sessions memorandum to 
prosecutors also categorized specific immigration crimes as top priorities: illegal entry, illegal reentry, 
identity theft, fraud and misuse of visas, and assaulting, resisting, or impeding officers. Id. at 1–2. 
 52 Id. As part of the research for this Article, I requested copies of these guidelines produced by 
each border district pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The DOJ refused to produce its pros-
ecution guidelines, however, claiming that such materials are “not public.” Letter from Kevin Krebs, 
Assistant Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, to author (July 27, 2018) (on file with author). 
 53 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 4, at 2. Three months later, in a training 
bulletin published by the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, Attorney General Sessions reiterated 
that “[o]ne of the Department’s top priorities is criminal immigration enforcement.” U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, Prosecuting Criminal Immigration Offenses, 65 U.S. ATT’YS’ 
BULL., July 2017, at 1, https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/986131/download [https://perma.cc/
M3UR-6NZJ]. 
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In pursuing these and other policies to criminalize migrants, President 
Trump and members of his administration continually tried to justify their bor-
der policies by associating immigrants of color with crime. Administration of-
ficials have characterized Mexicans and Central Americans coming to seek 
asylum as a “stampede”54 of “dangerous”55 criminals that threaten to over-
whelm the United States. President Trump has also referred to countries such 
as Haiti and El Salvador as “shithole” countries and expressed a preference for 
admitting immigrants from predominately white European countries like Nor-
way.56 President Trump has even said that “people trying to come in” are “not 
people,” but “animals.”57 These and other comments have been found by sev-
eral courts to reflect animus on the basis of both race and national origin.58 As 
a district court judge in Maryland wrote in 2018, “[o]ne could hardly find more 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent towards Latino immigrants.”59 
Characterizing targeted groups as subhuman has long served as a strategy 
for subordination.60 The process of dehumanization is associated with perceiv-
ing the out-group as a threat,61 and thus justifying the use of the criminal law 
as a form of regulation. As historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad has shown, 
Southern criminal codes following the Civil War were crafted as racial codes, 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Discussing the Immigra-
tion Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions 
[https://perma.cc/EKC3-KBE9] (“People are not going to caravan or otherwise stampede our bor-
der.”). 
 55 In a Twitter post, President Trump warned that the border was “[g]etting more dangerous. 
‘Caravans’ coming.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 1, 2018, 6:56 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/980443810529533952 [https://perma.cc/6644-C2LN]. 
 56 Ibram X. Kendi, The Day ‘Shithole’ Entered the Presidential Lexicon, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/shithole-countries/580054/ [https://perma.
cc/CV7A-RJDX]. 
 57 Dara Lind, Trump on Deported Immigrants: “They’re Not People. They’re Animals,” VOX 
(May 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/16/17362870/trump-immigrants-animals-ms-13-illegal 
[https://perma.cc/R9M9-DGUF]. 
 58 See, e.g., Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that the record 
contains direct evidence of animus against non-white immigrants that influenced the administration’s 
immigration decision making); NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 578 
(D. Md. 2019) (discussing the significance of President Trump’s alleged statements of animus target-
ing Haitians); Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (concluding that the 
plaintiffs “plausibly allege that President Trump harbored racial and national origin/ethnic animus”). 
 59 CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 325 (D. Md. 2018) (“Defendants do not 
suggest that President Trump’s alleged statements are not evidence of discriminatory motive on his 
part, nor could they.”). 
 60 See generally Nick Haslam & Steven Loughnan, Dehumanization and Infrahumanization, 65 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 399 (2014) (providing an in-depth discussion of the psychological process of 
dehumanization). 
 61 Id. at 404–05. 
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designed to establish “notions about blacks as criminals.”62 Widespread racial 
violence and discrimination was justified by prosecuting black citizens and 
marking them as criminals.63 
A similar ideology of racial subordination undergirds the criminalization 
of migration control. Since the time of Chinese exclusion, U.S. immigration 
law was constructed as an anti-abolitionist project, one that restricted migra-
tion along racial lines and marked those excluded from entry as “aliens.”64 The 
illegal entry and reentry laws were first deployed as part of an explicit policy 
of racial exclusion that resulted in the criminal prosecution of thousands of 
Mexican immigrants in the 1930s.65 Research by historian Kelly Lytle Hernán-
dez has uncovered that the original 1929 law, called the Undesirable Aliens 
Act, was sponsored by Senator Coleman Livingston Blease, a white suprema-
cist who sought to exclude Mexicans from the United States.66 Up to a million 
Mexicans and their children, many of whom were U.S. citizens, were forcibly 
repatriated to Mexico in the decade following the adoption of Senator Blease’s 
law.67  
Viewed in this historical lens and in the context of the racially charged 
statements made by President Trump, current border policies are increasingly 
understood as part of the country’s painful legacy of nativism and racial exclu-
sion. Indeed, according to one nationally representative survey, almost half of 
voters now agree that “racist beliefs” motivate the president’s immigration pol-
                                                                                                                           
 62 KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 4 (2010). 
 63 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (revealing how the U.S. criminal justice system functions to create a racial 
caste system, rather than to prevent and control crime); MUHAMMAD, supra note 62, at 15–88 (docu-
menting how, since the late nineteenth century, the criminalization of blacks has been used to justify 
racial prejudice and discrimination). 
 64 Kelly Lytle Hernández, Amnesty or Abolition? Felons, Illegals, and the Case for a New Aboli-
tion Movement, 1 BOOM: J. CAL., 54, 54 (2011). 
 65 Kelly Lytle Hernández, “Persecuted Like Criminals”: The Politics of Labor Emigration and 
Mexican Migration Controls in the 1920s and 1930s, 34 AZTLÁN: J. CHICANO STUD., 219, 219–39 
(2009); see also Eagly, supra note 1, at 1296–98, 1352–53 & fig.4. 
 66 Kelly Lytle Hernández, How Crossing the US-Mexico Border Became a Crime, THE CONVER-
SATION (Apr. 30, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-crossing-theus-mexico-border-became-a-
crime-74604 [https://perma.cc/RVN7-JYLH]; see also Alina Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial 
Animus and the Origins of Crime-Based Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 193 (2018) (de-
scribing Senator Livingston Blease’s involvement in passage of the 1929 law). 
 67 FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN 
REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 339 (2006); see also Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Mi-
gration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 658–63 (1981) 
(chronicling the history of U.S. restrictions on Mexican migration in the post-World War I period); 
Park, supra note 7, at 1917–18 (tracing the emergence of a “voluntary departure” program to promote 
the “self-deportation” of Mexicans in the 1920s and 1930s). 
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icies.68 Sixty percent think that the policy discussed in Part II, family separa-
tion, violates human rights.69 
B. “Zero Tolerance” for Illegal Entry 
In April 2017, the Justice Department ordered U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
along the Southwest border “to accomplish the goal of deterring first-time im-
proper entrants.”70 Under this directive from headquarters, regional prosecutors 
were expected to shift their practices and more rigorously enforce the law 
against first-time border crossers.71 Although the DOJ policy was not yet for-
mally one of zero tolerance, prosecutors began to decline fewer illegal entry 
charges.72 This indicated a change from prior presidential administrations that 
made first-time entrants the lowest priority for criminal prosecution.73 Instead, 
U.S. Attorneys were encouraged to focus their attention on cases of individuals 
with criminal records and prior deportations.74 
Court observers soon began to descend on federal courts where these cas-
es were being filed and share information about what was happening. Mem-
bers of the press attending court in Tucson, Arizona documented courtrooms 
filled with individuals who were trying to enter the United States for the first 
time, including women traveling with young children.75 Human rights re-
                                                                                                                           
 68 Harsh Words for U.S. Family Separation Policy, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 
Voters Have Dim View of Trump, Dems on Immigration, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL (July 3, 
2018), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2554 [https://perma.cc/MMN3-MEPK] 
(finding, based on a survey of 1,020 registered voters, that 44% of respondents believed that the “main 
motive” behind President Trump’s immigration policies is “racist beliefs,” rather than “a sincere inter-
est in controlling our borders”). 
 69 Id. (reporting that 60% of respondents thought that “the policy of separating children from their 
parents at the border was a violation of human rights”). 
 70 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 4, at 2. 
 71 Id. 
 72 For helpful background on the importance of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice 
system, see Kay Levine, Prosecutorial Discretion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 4081, 4081–88 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2013). 
 73 See Jeh Johnson, Opinion, Trump-Era Politics Are Drowning Out Consensus Immigration. It’s 
Time for Some Straight Talk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/07/06/trump-era-politics-are-drowning-out-consensus-immigration-its-time-some-straight-talk/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RLT-X2CG] (noting that except for the Trump administration’s “‘zero-tolerance’ 
policy,” first-time entrants have rarely been prosecuted for illegal entry). 
 74 See generally PATRISIA MACÍAS-ROJAS, FROM DEPORTATION TO PRISON: THE POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 95, 192 n.53 (2016) (quoting a No-
vember 22, 2005, internal memorandum from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys explaining that 
along the southwest border first-time entrants with no prior criminal or immigration history are “al-
most certainly” not prosecuted criminally so that prosecutors may instead “spend their resources on 
the more serious offenses”). 
 75 See Curt Prendergast, Trump Immigration Policies Take Root in Tucson Federal Court, ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR (June 29, 2017), http://tucson.com/news/local/trump-immigration-policies-take-root-in-
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searcher Natasha Arnpriester similarly observed court sessions along the bor-
der in which individuals were criminally prosecuted even after informing the 
judge that they had come to the United States to seek asylum.76 
On April 6, 2018, Attorney General Sessions officially directed the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices along the Southwest border to adopt a policy of “zero toler-
ance for [illegal entry] offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).”77 In the press re-
lease accompanying the announcement, Sessions warned that “illegally enter-
ing this country will not be rewarded, but will instead be met with the full 
prosecutorial powers of the Department of Justice.”78 Following this new pro-
tocol meant that prosecutors could no longer exercise discretion to decline 
prosecutions in favor of allowing the civil immigration system to handle the 
return of illegal entrants. 
The Trump DOJ built its zero-tolerance program on the existing structure 
for high-volume border prosecutions established under President George W. 
Bush.79 Under a program known as Operation Streamline, federal prosecutors 
greatly increased the number of illegal entry convictions by relying on federal 
magistrate courts to implement a system of mass guilty pleas.80 After begin-
ning in the Del Rio, Texas, sector of the border, Operation Streamline gradual-
ly spread across more Southwest border districts and fueled unmanageably 
large caseloads.81 Although during some periods Streamline was said to be a 
zero-tolerance program, no jurisdiction ever prosecuted all entrants. There 
were clear carve-outs, such as for parents traveling with minor children and 
persons with health conditions.82 
                                                                                                                           
tucson-federal-court/Article_59fa7c29-bcc2-5b49-8311-0310249a05f0.html [https://perma.cc/GK4R-
ZRFA] (discussing the Trump administration’s Operation Streamline program in Arizona). 
 76 See HUM. RIGHTS FIRST, BRIEF, THE RISE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
(2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-criminal-prosecution-of-asylum-seekers.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AGY5-Q87M] (documenting a rise in the criminal prosecution of asylum seek-
ers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona). 
 77 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Fed. Prose-
cutors Along the Southwest Border, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Apr. 6, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/download [https://perma.cc/AF4U-
2CNT]. 
 78 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero-
Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/NNB8-86ZL]. 
 79 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 16 (2008) (on file with author) [herein-
after REPORT ON SOUTHWEST BORDER]. 
 80 See Eagly, supra note 1, at 1325–30 (discussing the development of Operation Streamline). 
 81 REPORT ON SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra note 79, at 16–18 (documenting how federal border 
courts responded to surging immigration caseloads, including by requesting additional clerks, proba-
tion and pretrial service officers, and defense attorneys). 
 82 LYDGATE, supra note 10, at 3 n.11. 
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Figure 2 tracks prosecutions for illegal entry in federal magistrate courts 
since the beginning of the George W. Bush administration. As Figure 2 high-
lights, after the Streamline program was announced in 2005, the number of 
illegal entry cases skyrocketed, more than doubling by the time President 
Obama took office. President Obama did not discontinue Streamline.83 In fact, 
during the first half of his presidency, illegal entry cases ballooned to a high of 
72,278 (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Federal Prosecutions for Illegal Entry in 
U.S. Magistrate Courts, 2001–201984 
 This substantial rise in illegal entry cases during the early years of the 
Obama administration coincided with a failed 2013 effort to achieve compre-
hensive immigration reform.85 Under the political negotiations at the time, se-
curing the border through criminal enforcement was considered crucial to 
achieving bipartisan support for the legalization of millions of undocumented 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on Border, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/split-second-justice-as-us-cracks-
down-on-border-crossers.html [https://perma.cc/8ZAG-E94D] (discussing the growth of Operation 
Streamline the Obama administration). 
 84 Figure 2 includes all petty immigration offenses disposed of by U.S. magistrate court judges. 
Data reported in Figure 2 were obtained from JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2, 
tbl.M-2 (Sept. 30, 2001–Sept. 30, 2019). 
 85 In 2013, a bipartisan group of Senators known as the “Gang of Eight” announced a pathway to 
comprehensive immigration reform, culminating the passage of S. 744 in the Senate. Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill was 
never passed by the House. 
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individuals.86 As hope for an immigration overhaul faded, President Obama 
began to gradually shrink his administration’s involvement in the Streamline 
initiative. He did so primarily by shifting the focus of the DOJ away from 
prosecution of first-time border crossers with no criminal or immigration histo-
ry.87 The result, as shown in Figure 2, was a steep decline in the number of 
misdemeanor illegal entry cases between 2013 and 2017. 
During President Trump’s administration, misdemeanor illegal entry cases 
brought before federal magistrate judges took off once again. After zero toler-
ance was announced, convictions for fiscal year 2018 reached 80,117, a level 
higher than under any other president (Figure 2).88 In 2019, under Attorney Gen-
eral William Barr’s leadership, that record was shattered once again, reaching 
91,466 cases (Figure 2).89 In a sudden turn of events at the beginning of 2020, 
concerns about the rapid spread of the pandemic caused by the coronavirus have 
triggered U.S. Attorneys’ Offices along the Southwest border to suspend at least 
some of the administration’s illegal entry prosecutions.90 Whether the pandemic 
will have a lasting impact on prosecution patterns remains to be seen. 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See A Guide to S.744: Understanding the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (July 10, 2013), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-s744-under-
standing-2013-senate-immigration-bill [https://perma.cc/D6KX-LY6S] (summarizing how S. 744 
would have balanced securing the border with creating a legalization program for individuals who 
were already here). 
 87 See, e.g., CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RES. SERV., BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION EN-
FORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 8 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2QRH-YTFD] (pointing out that as of 2014, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona 
ceased prosecuting first-time unauthorized border crossers); see also Sen. Jeff Flake Calls for ‘Zero 
Tolerance’ of Illegal Border Crossing, KTAR NEWS (June 23, 2017), https://ktar.com/story/1634732/
flake-jeff-operation-streamline/ [https://perma.cc/87SQ-EPMG] (quoting former U.S. Senator Jeff 
Flake’s letter to Attorney General Sessions as stating, “[u]nfortunately, despite (Operation Stream-
line’s) effectiveness, the previous administration sought to water down its deterrent effect by shifting 
its policy to targeting only first-time illegal border crossers whom had a known criminal history or 
were otherwise a threat to public safety”). 
 88 Shortly before being appointed as the new Attorney General, William Barr published an op-ed 
in the Washington Post praising Attorney General Sessions for “breaking the record for prosecution of 
illegal-entry cases.” William P. Barr et al., Opinion, We Are Former Attorneys General. We Salute 
Jeff Sessions, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessions-
can-look-back-on-a-job-well-done/2018/11/07/527e5830-e2cf-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XU6D-SF8W]. 
 89 Immigration crime was 76% (91,466 out of 120,970) of all cases disposed of by U.S. Magis-
trate Judges during fiscal year 2019. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2, 
tbl.M-2 (Sept. 30, 2019). 
 90 Due to concerns over social distancing in federal courts, U.S. Attorneys in California, Arizona, 
and New Mexico announced that they would no longer prosecute first-time border entrants. Ryan 
Devereaux, Mass Immigration Prosecutions on the Border Are Currently on Hold. What Comes Next 
Is Uncertain, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 18, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/03/18/immigration-
border-prosecution-coronavirus/ [http://perma.cc/RDF6-SKF7]. 
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C. Enhanced Punishment for Illegal Reentry 
The Trump administration’s policy priorities have included not only ille-
gal entry prosecutions but also reentry prosecutions. As explained the earlier, 
individuals are subject to the reentry statute when they cross the border with-
out permission after previously being deported.91 On October 8, 2017, Presi-
dent Trump delivered a letter to House and Senate leaders titled “Immigration 
Principles and Policies” that set forth his goal to increase criminal punishment 
for “repeat illegal border crossers and those with prior deportations.”92 
 Attempting to increase penalties for illegal reentry signaled a clear break 
from prior administrations. Since the 1990s, illegal reentry cases have been 
part of the DOJ’s sentence reduction program known as the “fast track.”93 The 
fast track began in the border districts that had high volumes of immigration 
crime cases, out of a need to prosecute these cases more quickly.94 It eventually 
spread to every district in the nation.95 Under the fast track, defendants in ille-
gal reentry cases are offered a significant reduction in their applicable Guide-
line sentencing range.96 In exchange, defendants must plead guilty on an expe-
dited timetable and waive other important rights, such as the right to appeal.97 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 92 See generally Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to House and Senate Lead-
ers, Immigration Principles and Policies, § 1.F (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trumps-letter-house-senate-leaders-immigration-principles-policies 
[https://perma.cc/9ZW2-YCAU] (“Many Americans are victims of crime committed by individuals 
who have repeatedly entered the United States illegally, which also undermines the integrity of the 
entire immigration system. Therefore, the Administration proposes increasing penalties for repeat 
illegal border crossers and those with prior deportations.”). 
 93 Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, to All U.S. Attorneys, Department Principles 
for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or “Fast-Track” Prosecution Program in a District 1 (Sept. 
22, 2003), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-39321.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NKB-PRKB]. 
 94 See Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox 
of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 517 
(2006) (explaining how several federal district courts in the Southwest region have created “fast-
track” or “early disposition” programs in an effort to expand the number of prosecutions and combat 
the challenges of limited resources). 
 95 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. James M. Cole, to All U.S. Attorneys, Depart-
ment Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-Track” Programs 3 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED96-AUWQ] 
(“Districts prosecuting felony illegal reentry cases (8 U.S.C. § 1326) the largest category of cases 
authorized for fast-track treatment—shall implement an early disposition program . . . .”); U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n, Written Testimony from Maria E. Stratton, Fed. Pub. Def. for the Cent. Dist. of 
Cal., 1, 3 (Sept. 18, 2003), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
hearings-and-meetings/20030923/stratton.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TDA-WC7C] (noting that when the 
“fast track” was rolled out in the Central District of California, the U.S. Attorney’s Office was “very 
candid in notifying court and counsel that under the fast track, the government anticipated that it 
would double or triple the number of illegal reentry/improper entry prosecutions in the district”). 
 96 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (au-
thorizing a downward departure on motion of the government); see also Thomas Bak, Illegal Immi-
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Shortly after Attorney General Sessions issued his April 2017 memoran-
dum to prosecutors instructing them to renew their “commitment to criminal 
immigration enforcement,”98 districts began to change their immigration fast-
track programs to make them less generous. Defense attorneys reported that 
prosecutors replaced their standard recommendation of a four-level downward 
variance in sentencing range with a smaller two-level variance.99 In border dis-
tricts, public defenders also disclosed that “flip-flop” pleas100—which allow a 
defendant charged with a felony under Section 1326 to instead plea to a mis-
demeanor Section 1325 charge—became less frequent.101 Importantly, howev-
er, data reveal that these harsher sentencing recommendations by prosecutors 
have not resulted in higher sentences. Although prosecutors may recommend a 
sentence to the court, they do not have ultimate authority over the sentence 
applied—such discretion rests with the sentencing judge. 
Table 1 tracks the average and median sentence for illegal reentry convic-
tions sentenced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines since 2000. These data 
show a steady decline over time in the length of sentences imposed by federal 
judges for illegal reentry. The median sentence for illegal reentry has plum-
meted by eighty-two percent, from a high of thirty-three months in 2000 to 
only six months in 2018.102 
                                                                                                                           
gration and the Southwest Border District Courts, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 569, 573 n.19 (2008) (dis-
cussing the effect of plea bargaining on sentencing in illegal reentry cases); Alan D. Bersin, Reinvent-
ing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern District of California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 
256 (1996) (explaining the requirements for an illegal reentry defendant to receive a more favorable 
disposition under the fast-track program in the Southern District of California). 
 97 See generally Eagly, supra note 1, at 1321–25 (documenting the speed of the fast-track plea 
process in § 1326 cases); Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 220 (2005) (elucidating how plea waivers are used by prosecu-
tors in plea bargaining to avoid appeals). 
 98 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 4. 
 99 E-mail from Milagros Cisneros, Assistant Fed. Pub. Def., Fed. Pub. Defs.’ Office for the Dist. 
of Ariz., to author (May 16, 2018, 07:12 AM) (on file with author) (“With regards to the 1326 fast-
track, it used to be that pretty much everyone would get a 4-level reduction, but now AUSAs have 
more discretion to decide that some defendants are more unsavory and they only offer two levels 
off.”); E-mail from Alexander E. Ramos, Assistant Fed. Pub. Def., Fed. Pub. Defs.’ Office for the 
Dist. of Utah, to author (May 17, 2018, 06:37 AM) (on file with author) (explaining that although both 
prior to and leading up to the election, the standard was a four-level reduction “across the board,” 
today, individuals with prior illegal reentries and no other criminal history only receive two level 
reductions); E-mail from Kim Savo, Deputy Fed. Pub. Def., Fed. Pub. Defs.’ Office for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal., to author (May 9, 2018, 08:13 AM) (on file with author) (noting that “the new program was 
not rolled out until the Trump Administration came into office”). 
 100 Eagly, supra note 1, at 1329 (discussing “flip-flop” plea agreements in the immigration crime 
context). 
 101 See, e.g., Cisneros, supra note 99 (noting that although “[t]owards the end of the Obama Ad-
ministration we had tons of flip-flops,” they are “now harder to come by”). 
 102 See infra Table 1. The average sentence also declined from thirty-six months in 2000 to only 
ten months in 2018. Id. 
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Table 1. Average and Median Sentence Length for Illegal Reentry Cases 











2018 10 6 18,241 
2017 12 8 15,895 
2016 14 9 15,813 
2015 16 10 15,815 
2014 17 12 16,674 
2013 18 12 18,658 
2012 19 13 19,463 
2011 19 13 21,488 
2010 20 14 19,910 
2009 21 15 17,308 
2008 23 18 13,622 
2007 26 21 10,949 
2006 27 24 11,346 
2005 27 24 10,494 
2004 29 24 9,684 
2003 28 24 9,244 
2002 30 26 7,052 
2001 35 30 6,041 
2000 36 33 6,415 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Table 1 analyzes U.S. Sentencing Commission data for cases sentenced under the illegal 
reentry Guideline (§ 2L1.2). Data for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 were downloaded from the Sen-
tencing Commission’s web page. Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, https://www.
ussc.gov/research/datafiles/commission-datafiles [https://perma.cc/T9AV-L2FB]. Data for fiscal years 
2000 to 2015 were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at 
the University of Michigan. Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences Series, ICPSR, http://www.
icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/83 [https://perma.cc/4JJF-5VTL]. In order to conduct this 
analysis, data for 2000 through 2018 was limited to those federal district court cases (n = 269,707) 
where the primary Sentencing Guideline category (GDLINEHI) was § 2L1.2, the Guideline for illegal 
reentry convictions. The sentences reported in Table 1 (SENSPLT0 variable) includes all imprison-
ment imposed by the sentencing judge. Cases with incomplete sentencing values (n = 304) were not 
included in the analysis. To make the measurement comparable to that reported by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, two cases with outlier sentences were also removed from the analysis (one with a 777 
month sentence, and the other with a 1,009 month sentence). See generally CHRISTINE KITCHENS, ANA-
LYZING FEDERAL SENTENCE LENGTH & TYPE, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESEARCH NOTES, ISSUE 
#2, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-notes/20190926_
Research-Notes-Issue2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WPA-V7QJ]. The author thanks Henry Kim of UCLA’s 
Empirical Research Group and the Office of Research and Data of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
for assistance with this analysis. 
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This downward slide in sentencing severity, which has continued during 
the Trump administration, reflects a gradual agreement by sentencing judges 
that reentry cases should receive lighter sentences. This trend has been facili-
tated in part by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. 
Booker finding that mandatory application of the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines to constrain sentencing judges was unconstitutional.104 To remedy this 
problem, the Court did not abolish the Sentencing Guidelines, but rather clari-
fied that they are only advisory.105 This discretion has allowed sentencing 
judges to deviate from the advisory range of the Guidelines and instead dis-
pense a sentence that they believe is reasonable in light of the conduct and any 
mitigating circumstances. In practice, federal judges have consistently chosen 
reentry sentences below the advisory range.106 
The decline in sentencing lengths also reflects the shared wisdom of sen-
tencing experts that illegal reentry sentences had become unduly harsh. In 
2016, the U.S. Sentencing Commission rolled back the recommended sentenc-
ing exposure for many defendants charged with violating Section 1326.107 In 
justifying the need for the amendment, the Commission was particularly criti-
cal of the “overly severe” sixteen-level sentencing enhancement that applied to 
some illegal reentry cases.108 As the Commission explained, many people 
reenter the United States to reunite with family, find employment, or escape 
horrific conditions in their own country.109 The Commission further noted that 
                                                                                                                           
 104 543 U.S. at 245. 
 105 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Federal judges must consider the advisory sentencing range calculated by 
applying the matrix in the Guidelines, but retain ultimate authority over federal sentencing. 
 106 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 32 fig.I (2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2017_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNE3-3UYY] 
(tracking the average sentence imposed by federal judges in illegal reentry cases, as compared to the 
average Guideline minimum). 
 107 See Public Data Briefing: 2016 Illegal Reentry Amendment, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
http://www.ussc.gov/policymaking/amendments/illegal-reentry-data-briefing [https://perma.cc/LG3F-
Z49A] (summarizing descriptive statistics on past illegal reentry cases and explaining how the 2016 
amendment to the illegal reentry Guideline was predicted to reduce the overall average Guideline 
minimum by three months). 
 108 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 24 (Apr. 28, 
2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/
20160428_RF.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ4Y-QTAD]. For additional critique of the enhancements for 
prior convictions in illegal reentry cases, see Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing En-
hancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 719, 719–24 (2010). 
 109 See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Approves Signifi-
cant Changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/about/news/
press-releases/april-15-2016 [https://perma.cc/V4CS-T9NY] (discussing reasons for compassion in 
sentencing). For a moving chronicle of the reasons why many deportees return to the United States, 
see BETH C. CALDWELL, DEPORTED AMERICANS: LIFE AFTER DEPORTATION TO MEXICO (2019). 
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judges were rejecting the advisory Guideline range in the majority of cases.110 
After completing a multi-year study, the Commission concluded that basic 
fairness demanded a revised Guideline.111 The amendment, which was ap-
proved by Congress, significantly reduced the harshest standard that was pre-
viously applied when calculating some defendants’ total offense level for ille-
gal reentry.112 This Guideline revision has further contributed to the continuing 
downturn in illegal reentry sentences (Table 1).113 
In conclusion, President Trump inherited a federal criminal system that 
already prosecuted huge numbers of immigration cases.114 Yet, although these 
                                                                                                                           
 110 In 2015, only 29.7% of defendants with sixteen-level enhancements were sentenced within 
range. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENT TO THE ILLEGAL REENTRY (§ 2L1.2) GUIDE-
LINE 8 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/illegal_reentry_briefing.pdf [https://perma.
cc/S4L5-M2NZ] (providing sentencing statistics for immigration crimes). The original illegal reentry 
Guideline went into effect in 1991 without the benefit of any empirical research regarding whether the 
recommended sentences were consistent with the goals of sentencing in reentry cases. See Robert J. 
McWhirter & Jon M. Sands, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Defense Perspective on Sentenc-
ing in Aggravated Felon Re-Entry Cases, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 275, 276 (1996) (stating that there was 
no study done to support the amendment). 
 111 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
supra note 108, at 25 (explaining that the amendments to the illegal reentry Guideline were warranted 
and informed by the multi-year study of immigration offenses conducted by the Commission); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 27–29 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/immigration/2015_Illegal-
Reentry-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FC5-QC6D] (summarizing key findings based on the Commis-
sion’s analysis of data from a sample of 18,498 illegal reentry cases). 
 112 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 
108, at 36–39 (presenting the text of the 2016 amendment to the manner in which illegal reentry sen-
tences are enhanced, including by reducing the prior sixteen-level enhancement to a ten-level en-
hancement). 
 113 President Trump’s DOJ has, however, begun to chip away at this sentencing reform effort by 
pursuing amendments to the Guidelines that increase the advisory sentencing range for illegal reentry. 
See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth A. Blanco, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, to the Honorable William H. Pryor, Jr., Acting Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 10 (July 31, 
2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20170731/
DOJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDY8-5KW7] (advocating for technical amendments to the illegal reentry 
Guideline). For example, an amendment adopted in 2018 will effectively increase the recommended 
Guideline range for some illegal reentry defendants. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ILLEGAL 
REENTRY GUIDELINE ENHANCEMENTS (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/education/training-resources/
2018-illegal-reentry-amendment [https://perma.cc/8A9L-3MFB] (click on “Illegal Reentry Amend-
ment”). 
 114 As legal scholars Jennifer Chacón, Bill Ong Hing, and Kevin Johnson have persuasively 
shown, rigorous immigration enforcement was already a prominent element of the Justice Depart-
ment’s work when President Trump took office. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pul-
pit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 245 (2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
vol130_Chacon.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP2S-J3V5] (arguing that President Trump’s immigration en-
forcement agenda as announced in his Executive Orders represents a “doubling down” on enforce-
ment policies already in place under the Obama administration); Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump 
Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 272 
(2018) (“So far, the criminal enforcement efforts under the Trump Administration—and its collateral 
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prosecutions had dominated border courts for decades, in the past they took 
place quietly, without much public knowledge of their impact. As Part I estab-
lished, the Trump administration’s “renewed focus” on immigration crime re-
sulted in record numbers of convictions, but did not succeed in dispensing 
harsher penalties. More importantly, as Part II develops further, the Trump era 
has exposed deep flaws in the existing system for border policing and ignited a 
grassroots campaign to repeal the illegal entry and reentry laws.115 
II. THE MOVEMENT TO RESIST BORDER CRIMINALIZATION 
Part II is structured around three flash points that have been central to the 
decriminalization movement—the separation of families, the prosecution of 
asylum seekers, and the segregation of Latinx defendants in an inferior, immi-
grant-only court system. These three areas of resistance have not emerged sep-
arately, but rather are each components of the growing tension between the 
federal government’s evolving immigration crime agenda and the rights and 
values inherent in the U.S. justice system. 
A. Ending the Forced Separation of Families 
In the summer of 2017, reports began to emerge of parents being separat-
ed from their children and prosecuted for illegal entry in El Paso, Texas.116 
                                                                                                                           
consequences—strongly simulate that of the Obama Administration.”); Johnson, supra note 6, at 615 
(characterizing President Obama’s policies as “the foundation” of “President Trump’s systematic 
efforts to dramatically escalate immigration enforcement”). 
 115 The current wave of resistance to border criminalization has taken many forms, including 
community mobilization, political action, in-depth reporting, and strategic lawyering. As Rebecca 
Sharpless has argued, often it is not “rationale dialogue” with government and civil society that results 
in transformative immigration policy change, but rather “strategic” lawyering, mobilizing, and re-
sistance strategies. Rebecca Sharpless, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Detention of Immigrant 
Families, 47 N.M. L. REV. 19, 49–53 (2017); see also Sameer Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight 
for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1464–66 (2017) (showing how “movement-centered 
organizations,” community members, and lawyers have played essential roles in resisting immigration 
enforcement). 
 116 Transcript of Motion Hearing at 33, Ms. L. v. ICE, No. 18-0428 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ms-l-v-ice-hearing-transcript [https://perma.cc/A78R-JWHQ] 
(quoting counsel for the plaintiffs informing the court that the family separation policy “now appears 
to date back to El, Paso, Texas in July of 2017”); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC., DHS LACKED TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOUNT FOR SEPARATED 
MIGRANT FAMILIES, OIG-20-06, at 5 (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-
11/OIG-20-06-Nov19.pdf [https://perma.cc/79T4-FQR7] (finding that the Border Patrol’s El Paso 
Sector began to prosecute parents and separate them from their children in July 2017). As the Office 
of Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services would later reveal, thousands 
of children were in fact separated from their parents by the administration before the official disclo-
sure of a family separation policy on May 7, 2018. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM SERVS., SEPARATED CHILDREN PLACED IN OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT CARE, OEI-
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Although there was no official announcement of a policy of family separation, 
there had been hints that such a strategy would be pursued. Shortly after Presi-
dent Trump was elected, then-DHS Secretary Kelly told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in 
an interview that he “would do almost anything to deter” Central American 
migration, including separating children from their parents and placing them in 
detention facilities or foster care “as we deal with their parents.”117 On May 7, 
2018, just over a month after first announcing zero tolerance, Attorney General 
Sessions spoke to state and local law enforcement officers on the California 
border with Mexico. In a speech punctuated by the cries of protestors, Sessions 
announced that “100 percent of illegal Southwest Border crossings [are now 
being reported] to the Department of Justice for prosecution.”118 He also used 
the public event to remind border crossers of his agency’s zero-tolerance pos-
ture: “I have put in place a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for illegal entry on our 
Southwest border. If you cross this border unlawfully, then we will prosecute 
you. It’s that simple.”119 Importantly, Sessions added that parents crossing the 
border with their children would be separated: “If you are smuggling a child, 
then we will prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as re-
quired by law.”120 
The administration’s family separation policy quickly became a central 
focus of opposition to the Trump administration’s border practices. While par-
ents were prosecuted for misdemeanor illegal entry, their children were moved 
to detention centers in different locations, sometimes thousands of miles away. 
News reports contained images of children separated from their parents being 
housed in unsanitary, crowded chain-link cages.121 An audio recording of chil-
dren screaming “Mami” and “Papa” over and over again as they were mocked 
by a Border Patrol agent went viral,122 as did a photograph of a toddler sobbing 
                                                                                                                           
BL-18-00511 (2019), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-BL-18-00511.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV7M-
R629]. According to the OIG investigation, the precise number of children separated is “unknown” 
due to the lack of an effective system for identification. Id. at 1. 
 117 Daniella Diaz, Kelly: DHS Is Considering Separating Undocumented Children from Their 
Parents at the Border, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics/john-kelly-
separating-children-from-parents-immigration-border [https://perma.cc/F6CS-QS8R]. 
 118 Sessions, supra note 54. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 David A. Graham, Are Children Being Kept in ‘Cages’ at the Border?, THE ATLANTIC (June 18, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/ceci-nest-pas-une-cage/563072 [https://
perma.cc/BHX9-LJ83] (reporting children held in “cages” or “chain-link pens”). 
 122 Ginger Thompson, Listen to Crying Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from Their Parents 
at the Texas-Mexico Border, TEX. TRIB. (June 18, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/18/
listen-children-whove-just-been-separated-their-parents-texas-mexico-b [https://perma.cc/F32D-FBN5]. 
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as her mother was searched.123 Under pressure to explain what was happening 
to families, DHS disclosed in May 2018 that approximately 1,273 children had 
been separated from their parents due to the adult being prosecuted.124 By the 
summer of 2018, as many as three-thousand children had been forcibly sepa-
rated from their parents under the administration’s zero-tolerance policy.125 
Public reaction was swift. There was immediate opposition from civil 
rights experts on the ground. Lee Gelernt, a seasoned ACLU attorney, told the 
New Yorker: “Little kids are begging and screaming not to be taken from par-
ents . . . . It’s as bad as anything I’ve seen in twenty-five-plus years of doing 
this work.”126 Human Rights First, a nonprofit organization that provides legal 
assistance for asylum seekers, called the practice of separating children “un-
lawful and cruel.”127 The American Bar Association concluded that parent-
child separation offends basic standards of “family integrity and due pro-
cess.”128 And, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
                                                                                                                           
 123 News reports subsequently clarified that the young girl in the photograph was not separated 
from her mother. See Laura M. Holson & Sandra E. Garcia, She Became a Face of Family Separation 
at the Border. But She’s Still with Her Mother., N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/06/22/us/immigration-toddler-trump-media.html [https://perma.cc/SEM2-4PPS]. 
 124 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unac-
companied Alien Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration, 115th 
Cong. (May 23, 2018) (testimony of the Honorable Richard Hudson, Deputy Chief of the Operations 
Program, Law Enforcement Operations Directorate, U.S. Customs & Border Protection), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hudson%20Responses%20to%20QFRs.pdf [https://perma.
cc/E7F6-6WEJ] (testifying that 1,273 children, with an average age of eleven, were separated from 
their parents between April 19 and May 23, 2018 due to the adult being prosecuted). 
 125 WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
“ZERO TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R45266.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SAE-4X7Z]. In addition, thousands more children were separated from 
their parents before the administration announced the family separation policy on May 7, 2018. Id. 
 126 Jonathan Blitzer, How the Trump Administration Got Comfortable Separating Immigrant Kids 
from Their Parents, NEW YORKER (May 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/
how-the-trump-administration-got-comfortable-separating-immigrant-kids-from-their-parents [https://
perma.cc/GLB4-ECKF]. 
  127 Robyn Barnard & Natasha Arnpriester, Separating Children from their Parents to Deter Other 
Asylum Seekers Is Unlawful and Cruel, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.human
rightsfirst.org/blog/separating-children-their-parents-deter-other-asylum-seekers-unlawful-and-cruel 
[https://perma.cc/R4XW-HMSF]. 
 128 Letter from Hilarie Bass, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the Honorable Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 
12, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ABALetterFamilySepar-
ation%20061218.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC77-M7LR]. An investigation by Physicians 
for Human Rights concluded that the practice of separating families meets the criteria for torture. 
HAJAR HABBACH ET AL., “YOU WILL NEVER SEE YOUR CHILD AGAIN”: THE PERSISTENT PSYCHO-
LOGICAL EFFECTS OF FAMILY SEPARATION (Feb. 2020), https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/PHR-Report-2020-Family-Separation-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J94-5E9L]. 
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judged President Trump’s policy of “inflicting such abuse” on children “un-
conscionable.”129 
As news of separated families spread, the policy began to draw fire from 
individuals who do not usually comment on federal immigration policy. Hun-
dreds of laity and clergy of Attorney General Sessions’ own United Methodist 
Church signed a forceful statement condemning his family separation policy 
and charging Sessions with child abuse, immorality, racial discrimination, and 
“dissemination of doctrines contrary to the standards of doctrine of the United 
Methodist Church.”130 Federal Magistrate Judge Ronald Morgan of the South-
ern District of Texas openly empathized with parents being prosecuted in his 
courtroom, admonishing the Assistant U.S. Attorney on duty that the govern-
ment was responsible for children left without their parents: “If you can imag-
ine there’s a hell,” he scolded the prosecutor, “that’s probably what it looks 
like.”131 Mayors of Los Angeles, Houston, Tucson, and Albuquerque decried 
family separation as “morally reprehensible” and “utterly inconsistent with our 
values of decency and compassion.”132 U.S. District Court Judge Robert Brack 
of the District of New Mexico, who had presided over more misdemeanor ille-
gal entry prosecutions than any other federal judge in the country, lamented: “I 
have presided over a process that destroys families for a long time, and I am 
weary of it . . . . And I think we as a country are better than this.”133 Even Re-
publican lawmakers expressed their disapproval: “I think this is inhumane,” a 
                                                                                                                           
 129 United Nations, 2000 Children Forcibly Separated from Their Parents and Other Topics—
Human Rights Council Briefing, at 36:24–37:07, YOUTUBE (June 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=1Xkni91tE6Q [https://perma.cc/9UB7-6K6J] (statement of United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid bin Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein). 
 130 Letter from Laity and Clergy of the United Methodist Church, to Rev. Boykin and Rev. Wines 
(July 18, 2018), http://s3.amazonaws.com/Website_Properties/news-media/documents/A_Complain
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Their Parents, THE INTERCEPT (May 29, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/29/zero-tolerance-
border-policy-immigration-mass-trials-children [https://perma.cc/99C2-FENN]. 
 132 Letter from Eric Garcetti, Mayor, City of L.A., Sylvester Turner, Mayor, City of Hous., Jona-
than Rothschild, Mayor, City of Tucson & Tim Keller, Mayor, City of Albuquerque, to the Honorable 
Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice & the Honorable Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (June 7, 2018), https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/page/file/Letter%20
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com/nation/la-na-border-judge-deportations-20180524-story.html [https://perma.cc/PBC4-FKX9]. 
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Texas Congressman told the press, “the pictures that we have seen—that’s not 
the face of America.”134 
In addition to public condemnation, the family separation policy drew se-
rious legal scrutiny. In February 2018, the ACLU brought a national class-
action lawsuit on behalf of parents forcibly separated from their children, Ms. 
L. v. ICE.135 One of the plaintiffs, Ms. C., told the Border Patrol she and her 
son were seeking asylum, but her son was sent to a facility in Chicago while 
Ms. C. was prosecuted for unlawful entry.136 Ms. C. pled guilty and served 
twenty-five days in federal custody before being placed in a series of detention 
centers in Texas, all while separated from her son.137 The lawsuit challenged 
the government’s separation policy as unlawful and sought to reunite parents 
with their children.138 
As public concern and legal challenges mounted, President Trump abrupt-
ly announced he was changing the family separation policy. Saying that he 
didn’t “like the sight or the feeling of families being separated,”139 President 
Trump issued an Executive Order calling for families to be detained together, 
rather than separately, “during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or 
immigration proceedings involving their members.”140 Immediately following 
the June 20, 2018 announcement, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in districts along the 
border began to dismiss misdemeanors brought against parents traveling with 
their children.141 The next week, U.S. District Judge Dana Sabraw issued a pre-
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President Trump); see also Ron Nixon et al, Border Officials Suspend Handing Over Migrant Fami-
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liminary injunction in the Ms. L. v. ICE case enjoining the government from 
detaining parents without their children.142 
Although family separation had long been known to immigrant communi-
ties affected by vigorous enforcement policies, zero tolerance brought it fully 
into public view. As concern mounted, the public became more educated about 
the lasting negative impacts of separation on the emotional and psychological 
development of children.143 The formal reprieve in the family separation policy 
was a significant victory for those opposing the President’s immigration poli-
cies. Still, this victory covered only a small portion of those subject to Opera-
tion Streamline, and some children continue to be separated. For example, 
children traveling with relatives or caretakers other than parents, such as 
grandparents or aunts and uncles, are still separated in connection with ongo-
ing zero-tolerance prosecutions.144 Children traveling with parents with crimi-
nal records or parents being prosecuted for felony illegal reentry also continue 
to endure painful separations from their parents.145 
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seen Prisoners: Women in Immigration Detention Facilities in Arizona, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 695, 
711–41 (2009) (detailing the harm suffered by women in immigration detention, including the health 
risks resulting from the lack of adequate medical facilities). 
 144 See LAURA PEÑA & EFRÉN OLIVARES, TEX. C.R. PROJECT, THE REAL NATIONAL EMERGENCY: 
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 145 Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 415 F. Supp. 3d 980, 991–94 (S.D. Cal. 2020) 
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parents who are charged under § 1326 or who entered with a prior criminal history); see also Miriam 
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B. Protecting the Rights of Asylum Seekers 
A second aspect of President Trump’s prosecution program that has been 
alarming to many observers is that it criminalizes asylum seekers. Since 2014, 
there has been a sizable increase in people coming to the United States to seek 
protection.146 These asylum seekers, primarily from the Central American 
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, are fleeing extreme levels 
of violence in their home countries.147 Women and children, who are especially 
vulnerable to gang violence and domestic abuse, are among those now seeking 
refuge in the United States.148  
Targeting refugees is an intentional design element of the administration’s 
use of criminal law.149 By securing convictions, the government seeks to mark 
asylum seekers as “criminals” rather than legitimate protection seekers.150 In 
one high-profile example, the U.S. Attorney in San Diego brought criminal 
charges151 against a group of asylum seekers that President Trump had derided 
as a “caravan” of dangerous criminals.152  
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minor and often dated misdemeanors). 
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General Sessions clarified that the administration is going to “close loopholes and clarify our asylum 
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IRVINE L. REV. 359, 360–61 (2012). 
 151 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces 
First Criminal Illegal Entry Prosecutions of Suspected Caravan Members (May 1, 2018), https://www.
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Beyond labeling asylum seekers as criminals, the administration has also 
sought to make illegal entry convictions a ground to deny asylum. For exam-
ple, policy guidance released in the summer of 2018 instructed U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) personnel that they “may find an ap-
plicant’s illegal entry . . . including any conviction for illegal entry where the 
alien does not demonstrate good cause for the illegal entry, to weigh against a 
favorable exercise of discretion.”153 In addition, a leaked internal document 
revealed that the administration was attempting to devise a way to designate 
misdemeanor illegal entry as a “particularly serious crime” that would serve as 
an absolute bar to qualifying for asylum.154 
The criminal prosecution of asylum seekers is part of a much broader ef-
fort to turn the borders into “asylum free zones” in which due process and in-
ternational law do not apply.155 As President Trump advocated in a Twitter 
post: “When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or 
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.”156 Consistent with this 
goal of eliminating judicial review, former Attorney General Sessions vacated 
a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which held that asylum 
seekers are entitled to full evidentiary hearings before an immigration judge.157 
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In November 2018, President Trump issued a new Executive Order to deny 
asylum to anyone not arriving at a port of entry.158 Two months later, DHS an-
nounced the Migrant Protection Protocols, informally known as “Remain in 
Mexico,” which orders certain asylum applicants to wait in Mexico until their 
case can be heard by an immigration judge.159 And, shortly thereafter, DHS 
and the Attorney General published an interim final rule prohibiting migrants 
who resided or “transited en route” in a third country from seeking asylum in 
the United States.160 All of these policies and legal decisions have been chal-
lenged in court.161 
                                                                                                                           
policy guidance adopted to comply with Matter of A-R-C-G- further undercut other previous decisions 
that were relevant to claims for asylum made by individuals fleeing violence in Central America. 
USCIS Policy Memorandum, supra note 153. For timely analysis of these and other reforms imple-
mented by the Trump administration to reshape how immigration courts function, see Catherine Y. 
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 160 Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,830 (July 16, 2019) 
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 161 See, e.g., Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district 
court’s injunction against implementation and expansion of the administration’s Migrant Protection 
Protocols); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the 
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nant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019) (granting a nationwide injunction against the administra-
tion’s third-country transit bar that categorically denies asylum to almost anyone entering the United 
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stay granted, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019) (staying nationwide injunction pending disposition of the govern-
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Criminal prosecution quickly became a tool to destabilize the asylum pro-
cess. The Office of the Inspector General concluded that the Border Patrol rou-
tinely referred individuals who requested asylum for prosecution.162 According 
to one study, more than one quarter of defendants prosecuted under the 
Streamline program at the start of the Trump administration were seeking asy-
lum.163 
Defense lawyers appointed to represent these asylum seekers have argued 
that their prosecutions violate both domestic and international law.164 Specifi-
cally, attorneys point out that these prosecutions are inconsistent with the 1967 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), which 
the United States ratified in 1968.165 Pursuant to the Protocol, the United States 
is obligated to comply with the terms of the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), which prohibits the 
imposition of penalties for illegal entry provided that refugees present them-
selves to authorities without delay at the border.166 Specifically, Article 31(1) 
of the Protocol provides: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their 
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a ter-
ritory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 
1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided 
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 162 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STREAMLINE: MEASURING ITS 
EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING, OIG-15-95, at 1, 16 (2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_May15.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ8A-VNRT] [hereinafter OIG STREAMLINE 
REPORT]. 
 163 NATASHA ARNPRIESTER & OLGA BYRNE, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND 
MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 4, 13 (2018), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-Punishing-Refugees-Migrants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TD5N-627F] (surveying defense lawyers about the marked increase in the criminal 
prosecution of asylum seekers under the Trump administration). 
 164 See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10–19, United States v. Henriquez-Villanueva, No. 18-
50309 (9th Cir. May 22, 2019), 2019 WL 2290408, at *10–19 (arguing that the district court erred in 
refusing to recognize Ms. Hernandez as a protected asylum seeker under the Refugee Convention); 
United States v. Ramirez-Ortiz, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1154–56 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (summarizing a 
Section 1325 defendant’s claim that his prosecution violated the Refugee Convention and his domes-
tic statutory right to apply for asylum). 
 165 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(1), Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 166 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Introductory Note, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (prohibiting the imposition of penalties on asylum seekers, including “being 
charged with immigration or criminal offences relating to the seeking of asylum, or being arbitrarily 
detained purely on the basis of seeking asylum”). 
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they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show 
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.167 
Supporting the view that such prosecutions violate international law, in 2015 
the Office of Inspector General for DHS warned that “[u]sing Streamline to 
refer aliens expressing fear of persecution, prior to determining their refugee 
status” may violate the obligations of the United States under the Refugee Pro-
tocol.168 
Defense lawyers also urge that prosecuting asylum seekers contradicts the 
statutory guarantee that Congress enacted in codifying the Refugee Conven-
tion. Under the U.S. Code, “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United 
States or who arrives in the United States” must be allowed to apply for asy-
lum, “irrespective of such alien’s status.”169 Human rights experts maintain that 
the United States is impermissibly interfering with its non-refoulment obliga-
tions by imposing a criminal penalty and subjecting asylum seekers to a bewil-
dering Streamline process that may deter them from actually pursuing their 
asylum claim.170 Such prosecutions, they argue, are at odds with the commit-
ment of the United States to avoid penalizing bona fide asylum seekers.171 
Thus far, however, challenges to prosecutions of asylum seekers have not 
gained traction with federal courts, which have generally found that the Refu-
gee Protocol is not self-executing,172 and does not supersede the illegal entry 
and reentry statutes.173 
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Nationality Act’s provisions allowing for criminal punishment for illegal entry and reentry do not 
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 171 ARNPRIESTER & BYRNE, supra note 163, at 1, 3; cf. United States v. Malenge, 294 F. App’x 
642, 644 (2d Cir. 2008) (“This prosecution penalizes [the defendant asylum seeker] for her ignorance, 
in contradiction of our government’s policy of providing safe haven to refugees fleeing political vio-
lence and persecution. Moreover, this prosecution appears to place this U.S. Attorney’s Office at odds 
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 172 See, e.g., Cazun v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 856 F.3d 249, 257 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017) (characterizing 
the Convention as a “non-self-executing treaty”); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 
2002 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1967 
C. Challenging Streamline’s Segregation of Criminal Process 
President Trump’s zero-tolerance initiative has also raised serious ques-
tions about the propriety of the federal court procedures relied on for lightning-
fast guilty pleas. Under the Streamline program, defendants plead guilty in 
large groups.174 For example, in my own observations of the Streamline pro-
gram in California and Texas, I watched defendants plead guilty in groups of 
twenty or more, with mass waivers of rights followed by individual pleas that 
took only a few minutes. Judges presiding over these hearings did not have 
time to consider individualized factors, such as the economic or political forces 
that led the individuals to come to the United States. Instead, they addressed 
most all explanations and instructions to the entire group, often accepting a 
chorus of simultaneous yes-or-no answers as part of the plea colloquy. 
Concerns have surfaced about Operation Streamline since it was first es-
tablished in 2005. Scholars repeatedly called attention to the fact that Stream-
line—often referred to as “McJustice”175 or “Operation Steamroller”176—
fostered “assembly-line justice,”177 threatened basic due process rights,178 and 
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v. Reyes-Montano, No. 19-PO-3592 SMV-1, 2020 WL 733041, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2020) (“[T]he 
Convention is a non-self-executing treaty. It confers no rights upon Defendant absent congressional 
action.”); United States v. Velasquez-Luna, No. 18-MJ-11463-WQH, 2019 WL 338947, at *2 (S.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“Defendant cannot rely on Article 31(1) of the Protocol to challenge his prosecu-
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 174 See Astrid Galvan, More Border Crossers Prosecuted in ‘New Era’ of Enforcement, CHI. TRIB. 
(Nov. 5, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-border-crossing-prosecutions-2017
1105-story.html [https://perma.cc/RN42-NQY4] (featuring the Streamline court in Tucson, which can 
accommodate as many as seventy defendants in a single hearing). 
 175 Christina DeConcini, Op-Ed, My Immigrant Grandfather Would Be Appalled at the ‘McJus-
tice’ in the Courthouse Named for Him, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 17, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/opinion/op-ed/2018/05/17/jeff-sessions-immigration-court-tucson-adulteration-justice-deconcini/
618539002/ [https://perma.cc/W3HW-G8CQ]. 
 176 When I observed the Streamline court in San Diego in August 2018, one of the panel attorneys 
appearing in court told me that defense lawyers use the “Steamroller” term. 
 177 LYDGATE, supra note 10, at 3. 
 178 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (providing that “the court must address the defendant personally 
in open court”); United States v. Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d 1133, 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
that the mass plea proceedings under Operation Streamline violated Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11 and vacating the conviction). See generally Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: 
Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 635–36, 667–68 (2015) (presenting orig-
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severely constrained access to counsel.179 Commentators also pointed out that 
the program unnecessarily criminalized what could be adequately dealt with by 
the administrative immigration system.180 And, a bevy of experts questioned 
whether the price tag associated with the volume prosecution program could be 
justified given its limited deterrent effect on unauthorized migration.181 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where a substantial 
number of Streamline cases are processed, has also grappled with the pro-
gram’s shortcomings. In a 2009 case involving Tucson’s Streamline court, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that en masse questioning of Streamline defendants 
violated federal procedural rules that require individualized inquiry prior to 
entering a guilty plea.182 And, in a 2017 decision that was later reversed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court on mootness grounds, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
mass shackling of defendants in court (a practice relied upon to facilitate 
Streamline prosecutions) violated basic standards of due process.183 As the 
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tion system as lacking in basic transparency, predictability, and rule-based qualities”). 
 179 See Juan Rocha, Operation Streamline and the Criminal Justice System, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 
2011, at 30, https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/1111Streamline.pdf [https://perma.
cc/DUG9-MXQH] (explaining that the Operation Streamline court appoints only one defense attorney 
to represent all of the defendants presented for prosecution in a single day). 
 180 See, e.g., Morales, supra note 13, at 1264 (arguing that “incarceration on top of deportation is 
necessarily excessive because deportation has exhausted the State’s interest—there is simply nothing 
left for incarceration to vindicate”). 
 181 See, e.g., RANDY CAPPS ET AL., ADVANCES IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDER ENFORCEMENT: A RE-
VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCE DELIVERY SYSTEM 25 (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/publications/ConsequenceDelivery-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/M32S-JQK8] 
(“The high resource needs of Streamline, coupled with opportunity costs and relatively short prison 
sentences (six months or less), raise questions about the tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency 
in the program.”); Tara Buentello et al., Operation Streamline: Drowning Justice and Draining Dol-
lars Along the Rio Grande (July 2010) (Grassroots Leadership, working paper), https://derechos
humanosaz.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Operation-Streamline-Green-Paper.pdf [https://perma.
cc/J46L-A7X3] (discussing the astronomical cost associated with the Streamline prosecution program 
and concluding that the program is ineffective); Johnson, supra note 13, at 867–76 (weighing the costs 
and benefits of immigration crime prosecution, particularly when the price of incarceration is signifi-
cant). A 2015 report by DHS’s Office of Inspector General found that claims by Border Patrol about 
Streamline’s effectiveness failed to employ accurate empirical measurements. OIG STREAMLINE RE-
PORT, supra note 162, at 8–9. 
 182 United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 699–701 (9th Cir. 2009) (evaluating mass pro-
ceedings in which “an indistinct murmur or medley of yeses” is accepted as the guilty plea for a large 
group of defendants). As Michael Pinard writes in critiquing mass pleas: “The mass plea process is 
not a quest for truth, but it instead satiates the criminal legal system’s hunger for efficiency.” Michael 
Pinard, Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 
133 (2020), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NYULawReviewOnline-95-
Pinard.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP9P-3EVF]. 
 183 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 661 (9th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 138 S. 
Ct. 543 (2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (noting that the shackled defendants 
who brought the appeal had pled guilty to different offenses, including misdemeanor illegal entry). 
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Ninth Circuit warned, “[a] presumptively innocent defendant has the right to 
be treated with respect and dignity in a public courtroom, not like a bear on a 
chain.”184 
The outpouring of attention surrounding President Trump’s zero-tolerance 
initiative has exposed the procedural deficits of these mass prosecutions to far 
greater scrutiny. Press accounts have featured packed courtrooms with over-
burdened defense attorneys. A leaked photograph of the inside of a plea pro-
ceeding in Pecos, Texas captured thirty-seven Latinx defendants crowded into 
a courtroom, dressed in orange jump suits and lined up in shackles.185 On a hot 
day in the summer of 2018, more than one thousand demonstrators gathered 
outside the federal district court in Brownsville, Texas to protest the Streamline 
prosecutions happening inside the court.186 
These and other highly publicized moments have mobilized opposition 
from unexpected places. For instance, a bipartisan group of eighty-eight for-
mer U.S. Attorneys denounced the zero-tolerance policy, calling it “a radical 
departure from previous Justice Department policy” that is also “dangerous, 
expensive, and inconsistent with the values of the institution in which we 
served.”187 Even federal court judges who presided over illegal entry cases 
condemned President Trump’s Streamline initiative. James Stiven, a retired 
U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of California, called the pro-
gram a “fast-food process that sullies centuries of judicial tradition involving 
individualized determinations of guilt.”188 
Perhaps most noteworthy is the way that public defenders in San Diego 
have sounded an alarm regarding Streamline that has brought to light the initia-
tive’s corrosive impact on established criminal justice procedures. Although 
the Southern District of California had in the past handled large numbers of 
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 185 This leaked photograph was included in multiple press reports. See, e.g., Alexandra Ma, 
Leaked Photo Shows Mass Trial with 37 Accused Unauthorized Immigrants—Shackled Hand and 
Foot—Being Processed All at Once, BUS. INSIDER (June 5, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
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Because cameras are generally prohibited in federal courtrooms, photographs of Streamline proceed-
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 186 David Yaffe-Bellany, More than 1,000 Rally in Brownsville to Protest Family Separations, TEX. 
TRIB. (June 28, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/28/crowd-more-1000-rallies-brownsville-
protest-family-separations/ [https://perma.cc/N84H-6SM9]. 
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to End Family Separation, MEDIUM (June 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@formerusattorneys/
bipartisan-group-of-former-united-states-attorneys-call-on-sessions-to-end-child-detention-e129ae0
df0cf [https://perma.cc/2PK4-P3M5]. 
 188 James Stiven, Commentary, Mass Criminalization of Migrants via Operation Streamline Is 
Costly, Cruel and Unworkable Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 21, 2018), https://www.san
diegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-oe-utbg-migrants-justice-operation-streamline-2018
0621-story.html [https://perma.cc/8J6B-VPYL]. 
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felony illegal reentry cases, it had not previously embraced the mass misde-
meanor Streamline process.189 Carol Lam, the U.S. Attorney for the district 
during the G.W. Bush administration, had opposed Operation Streamline, dis-
missing it as “ineffective” and a symptom of a “deteriorating” criminal justice 
system.190 As a result, San Diego never adopted a mass hearing process in 
magistrate court.191 Instead, immigration crime cases in San Diego were han-
dled in federal district court along with other types of federal criminal matters. 
Defendants in these cases received the same procedural protections as in other 
federal cases. Defense lawyers were given time to counsel their clients, review 
discovery, and engage in motion practice. And judges treated each case indi-
vidually, from the initial appearance through to trial or sentencing. 
All of this changed after President Trump was elected. In the summer of 
2018, a “Streamline” court was established for the first time in San Diego.192 
Streamline moved primarily Latinx noncitizen defendants into a segregated 
courtroom dedicated to hearing only Section 1325 misdemeanor immigration 
cases.193 Substandard procedures were applied to these segregated proceedings, 
including an expedited timetable, limited time to meet with counsel, and pres-
sure to resolve the case at the initial appearance.194 Unlike in other misde-
meanor cases, defendants in Streamline proceedings were shackled, including 
during their initial meetings with attorneys.195 Additionally, unlike other mis-
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caseload-20180629-story.html [https://perma.cc/C7CM-W8S5]. 
 193 Letter from Reuben C. Cahn, Exec. Dir., Fed. Defs. of San Diego, to Barry Ted Moskowitz, 
Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, S.D. Cal. (June 22, 2018) (on file with author) (addressing “the most 
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 194 See Letter from Ruben C. Cahn, Exec. Dir., Fed. Defs. of San Diego, to the Honorable Barry 
Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, S.D. Cal. (June 4, 2018), https://www.voiceofsan
diego.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DSDI-Letter-to-Court-6.4.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8CQ-
ZE5C]. 
 195 Separate but Equal Courts Cahn Letter, supra note 193, at 1. 
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demeanants, Streamline defendants were detained as they awaited their initial 
court appearance.196 
Attorneys from the Federal Defenders of San Diego and members of the 
Criminal Justice Act Panel vigorously objected to the creation of a Streamline 
court in San Diego. At the very least, they argued, due process demanded a 
radical restructuring of the Streamline program that had been allowed to oper-
ate in other border districts.197 For example, rather than be forced to participate 
in pressurized proceedings, defendants should be given sufficient time with 
their lawyers to build trusting relationships, benefit from defense investigation, 
and present relevant factors at sentencing.198 And, like other misdemeanants in 
federal court, defendants in illegal entry cases should not be detained, or at 
least should be given the opportunity for a bond hearing.199 
These and other deficits of the Streamline program have become the sub-
ject of a momentous set of legal challenges filed by public defenders in the 
Southern District of California. One important line of cases focuses on the co-
erciveness of demanding a guilty plea after holding individuals in squalid con-
ditions in Border Patrol stations.200 Claudia Hernandez-Becerra, the defendant 
in a case pending before the Ninth Circuit, was only eighteen years old when 
she was arrested and placed in a frigid Border Patrol cell—known as a “hiel-
era,” Spanish for “icebox”—for three days.201 Lights in the hielera were kept 
on twenty-four hours a day, no showers or toothbrushes were available, thin 
mats were used as beds, and food consisted of juice, crackers, and frozen burri-
tos.202 When Ms. Becerra was finally allowed to meet with her lawyer, she was 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Id. 
 197 Letter from Reuben C. Cahn, Exec. Dir., Fed. Defs. of San Diego & Jami L. Ferrara, Representa-
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District Court, S.D. Cal. 4 (June 22, 2018), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/07/BTM-Proposal06.22.18-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/92G9-GSHU] [hereinafter Minimal Constitu-
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 198 Id. at 1–8. 
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 200 United States v. Claudia Hernandez-Becerra, No. 18-MJ-20491-WVG-H, 2018 WL 5830041 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-50403 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018). Other related cases 
raising similar issues are also pending. See, e.g., United States v. Bartolon-Gomez, No. 3:18-MJ-
20586-JLB-GPC, 2018 WL 5919677 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-50407 (9th 
Cir. Nov. 14, 2018); United States v. Genchi-Angel, No. 18-MJ-20277-JMA-CAB, 2018 WL 4468843 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-50353 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2019). 
 201 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Hernandez-Becerra, No. 18-50403 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019), 
2019 WL 1644608, at *1. See generally Mitzi Marquez-Avila, No More Hieleras: Doe v. Kelly’s 
Fight for Constitutional Rights at the Border, 66 UCLA L. REV. 818 (2019) (introducing the use of 
“hieleras” to the legal scholarship). 
 202 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 201, at 1, 7–9. For additional analysis of the deficits of 
these short-term holding facilities, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION DETEN-
TION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN DHS MANAGEMENT OF SHORT-TERM HOLD-
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in tears and could barely speak.203 Attorneys argue that clients like Ms. Becerra 
suffer from psychological trauma after being held in such miserable condi-
tions. Placed in desperate circumstances, they want to plead guilty to escape 
detention, but their lawyers question whether they can possibly make a know-
ing and intelligent plea that same day, as required by the program.204 Defense 
lawyers contend that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires a deeper 
and case-specific inquiry by presiding judges into circumstances which could 
impede a knowing and voluntary plea.205 In Ms. Becerra’s case, for example, 
the judge could have conducted a fuller inquiry concerning her young age, the 
fact that she had never been incarcerated, and her struggle to answer the 
judge’s questions in court.206 
In another set of cases that attack the very legitimacy of the Streamline 
court process, public defenders argue that Streamline’s inferior court system—
which is divided along lines of race, alienage, and nationality—denies defend-
ants “basic constitutional guarantees.”207 The central premise of these chal-
lenges is that established in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education: 
namely, that segregation of a disfavored class of people from the majority, 
even under circumstances that are “substantially equal,” cannot fulfill the con-
stitutional requirement of equal protection.208 Oscar Chavez-Diaz, one of the 
first people charged under Operation Streamline in San Diego, brought such a 
challenge.209 Mr. Chavez had no criminal record or deportation history.210 After 
his arrest in the summer of 2018, he was brought to a Border Patrol station 
where he was held in freezing conditions and not given sufficient food or wa-
ter.211 Mr. Chavez was shackled as he met with his lawyer in a room with sev-
eral U.S. Marshals present212 and was brought to court in a group with twenty-
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five other defendants.213 Although Mr. Chavez pleaded guilty, his lawyer first 
objected to the “entire system” of the Streamline court as a violation of equal 
protection.214 
On appeal, Mr. Chavez argued that the segregated Streamline court sys-
tem treats defendants in ways that “shock the contemporary conscience,” in-
cluding by holding defendants in freezing cells, not providing sufficient time to 
meet with counsel under confidential conditions, shackling defendants in pre-
court meetings with counsel and in the courtroom, and denying defendants the 
opportunity to have their lawyers make robust objections in court.215 These 
suspect procedures that apply to black and brown migrants in Streamline court 
are inferior to those that apply in district courts, yet the petty misdemeanors 
that the defendants are charged with are less serious than felonies prosecuted in 
district court. The Streamline procedures are also inferior to those that apply in 
the regular magistrate court handling misdemeanor criminal cases—where de-
fendants are not detained or chained, meet freely with counsel in confidential 
settings, and are not pressured to resolve their case at the initial appearance. 
Mr. Chavez and other Streamline defendants contend that prosecutors treat 
them differently because of their race, national origin, and alienage. To set 
forth their claims of animus, defendants rely on racist comments made by Pres-
ident Trump, both before and after he took office.216 
Although the Ninth Circuit deemed Mr. Chavez’s equal protection claims 
waived by his unconditional guilty plea,217 on remand his conviction was va-
cated on alternative grounds.218 Other appeals making their way to the Ninth 
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Circuit continue to challenge the unequal treatment of Latinx defendants and 
call on the government to justify its misdemeanor program as narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling government interest.219 At bottom, these equal protec-
tion challenges question the very legitimacy of the Streamline process. 
In conclusion, before President Trump’s election, border enforcement op-
erated without much public knowledge. Streamline courts adjudicated cases 
behind closed doors and with little media coverage. As Part II has outlined, 
President Trump’s “new era” of immigration prosecution has brought these 
practices into the limelight. Although current prosecution policies have gar-
nered support from some seeking increased border enforcement,220 they have 
also proven unpopular with wide sectors of the American public. Community 
members, judges, elected officials, clergy, public defenders, and leaders of 
nonprofit organizations have called the border practices of the Trump admin-
istration inhumane, cruel, and unlawful. 
III. REVISITING BORDER CRIMINALIZATION 
Part III examines the possibility of reforming criminal immigration law 
and practice. First, it surveys arguments made by scholars in the decade pre-
ceding President Trump’s election that range from increasing reliance on pros-
ecutorial discretion to ceasing border prosecutions entirely. Next, Part III con-
siders the growing momentum behind the proposal to repeal Sections 1325 and 
1326 of the federal criminal code, thereby removing from the books the very 
law that facilitates the systemic issues highlighted in Part II. Finally, Part III 
concludes by sketching how the civil immigration law could evolve in the ab-
sence of criminal sanctions for border crossing, including by developing a 
more robust system of graduated civil sanctions. 
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A. Frameworks for Reform 
Prior to the current political moment, legal scholars had already begun to 
ponder how the system for border prosecution might be reformed. These varied 
policy proposals provide a helpful starting point for discussion. 
Immigration scholar and former government official David Martin calls 
for a more constrained and strategic use of criminal prosecution to enforce mi-
gration laws. His approach is rooted in a belief in the importance of an effec-
tive system for enforcing the immigration law, which he explains is necessary 
to sustain public confidence in America’s system for lawful migration.221 Ac-
cording to Martin, the ongoing vitality of a generous system for lawful perma-
nent residence is dependent on providing sufficient assurance that unauthor-
ized migration is controlled.222 Although Professor Martin does not favor elim-
inating border prosecutions, he does warn that “the use of criminal sanctions 
needs to be carefully modulated.”223 Martin also suggests that the definition of 
some criminal statutes could be narrowed and criminal sanctions could be re-
visited to ensure proportionate sentencing.224 
Professor Mary Fan offers an alternative vision for change, informed by 
her view that illegal entry prosecutions result in “bafflingly wasteful expendi-
tures” because they are a “quick and easy way to rack up massive conviction 
statistics to meet case processing and conviction quotas.”225 “Fast and easy” 
immigration prosecutions, she points out, are associated with an overall de-
cline in other types of criminal cases that federal prosecutors have traditionally 
pursued, including narcotics violations and white collar crime.226 As a solution, 
Fan advocates recalibrating the baseline for appropriate federal prosecution of 
illegal entry. Guidelines could be put in place so that prosecutors pursue only 
individuals with a preexisting criminal record.227 Properly implemented, her 
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proposal would reallocate prosecutorial resources to those who “may be in 
greater need of deterrence and incapacitation and may pose a greater risk.”228 
At its core, Fan’s proposal rests on the idea that “criminal punishment and its 
costs should not turn just on the status of being an alien.”229 
Professor Victor Romero goes a step further and advocates decriminaliz-
ing illegal entry and reentry.230 According to Romero, merely crossing the bor-
der should not be treated as a crime, even for repeat border crossers, because 
such crimes do not include an element of specific intent.231 An important cave-
at to this rule is that Romero believes that an unauthorized border crosser could 
still “be deemed a criminal” if she “engaged in an act aside from crossing the 
border that would constitute a crime.”232 For example, under Romero’s ap-
proach, someone crossing the border while bringing in illegal narcotics should 
still be prosecuted because the act of transporting narcotics across the border 
constitutes a separate crime. Eliminating criminal penalties for border crossing, 
Romero contends, would help to “heal our racially-polarized discourse over 
immigration policy” and “channel scarce resources” on more serious threats, 
such as “those who smuggle drugs and weapons across the border.”233 
Like Romero, Daniel Morales challenges the legitimacy of both illegal 
entry and reentry, but grounds his theory in core tenets of the criminal law and 
political theory.234 For Morales, illegal entry and reentry—what he calls 
“crimes of migration”—fall short of fulfilling the harm principle, a basic re-
quirement for the criminal law.235 Because deportation ought to extinguish the 
state’s punitive interest, Morales argues, “incarceration on top of deportation is 
necessarily excessive . . . [and] there is simply nothing left for incarceration to 
vindicate.”236 For this and other reasons, Morales concludes that crimes of mi-
gration must not continue because they “are an illegitimate use of the criminal 
power.”237 Decriminalization would also, Morales points out, remove the “aura 
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of moral legitimacy” that illegal entry gives to the idea that migration is 
“harmful or wrong.”238 
As this discussion has shown, leading immigration scholars have engaged 
over the years in an academic debate about the appropriate use of criminal 
sanctions to enforce the immigration law. While some have sought to enhance 
prosecutorial discretion to insulate sympathetic migrants from prosecution, 
others have advocated ending illegal entry and reentry prosecutions entirely. 
This dialog about reforming the criminal immigration system parallels a 
broader conversation within the criminal law field regarding how to confront 
the ever-expanding realm of prisons, jails, and criminal codes. As Ben Levin 
cogently explains, although a consensus has emerged that criminal justice re-
form is needed, scholars frame what is wrong with the criminal legal system 
quite differently. Some define the problem as one of “overcriminalization” that 
requires shrinking an otherwise legitimate system by incarcerating fewer, 
while others define the problem as one of “mass incarceration” that necessi-
tates a fundamental shift away from reliance on the criminal law.239 Borrowing 
from Levin’s helpful typology, an “overcriminalization” approach sees the 
problem at the border as one of prosecutorial overreach, while a “mass incar-
ceration” approach focuses on the racialization of migration and other systemic 
inequities fueled by reliance on the criminal law. In other words, divergent 
views about what is wrong with the existing state of affairs invite different so-
lutions. As the next Section develops, the swelling attention brought to the 
border under the Trump administration has moved this conversation about 
problem definition and solution into the national spotlight. 
B. Repeal of Sections 1325 and 1326? 
On June 20, 2018, the day that President Trump announced the “end” to 
family separation,240 the Texas Observer published a powerful op-ed announc-
ing that “it’s time to decriminalize immigration.”241 The widely circulated es-
say was penned by the leaders of two influential nonprofit organizations, Judy 
Greene, Executive Director of Justice Strategies, and Bob Libal, Executive 
Director of Grassroots Leadership. Greene and Libal called out the DOJ’s bor-
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der prosecutions as an “appalling” practice that has created “a new mass incar-
ceration crisis.”242 “The best solution,” they concluded, “is to repeal the laws 
that allow for this injustice in the first place.”243 
In the week following the Texas Observer op-ed, the grassroots organiz-
ing group Mijente released a new agenda for the future of immigration poli-
cy.244 Ending Operation Streamline was featured as a central part of the organi-
zation’s platform.245 Also included as essential to any future immigration re-
form was the repeal of “8 U.S.C. § 1325 and 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the laws that 
criminalize migration and punish immigrant families.”246 Shortly thereafter, 
more than two hundred immigrant, faith, and racial and criminal justice groups 
came together to demand the repeal of Sections 1325 and 1326.247 In a letter to 
members of Congress, the coalition explained that the “heart-breaking separa-
tion of parents and children” had made clear that repeal is necessary.248 
Prioritizing the decriminalization of migration marks a significant depar-
ture from the agendas of most pro-immigration groups in years past. Tradition-
ally, the immigrant rights movement has supported a comprehensive immigra-
tion reform that carves out immigrants with criminal justice involvement from 
their agenda. In 1999, Peter Schuck and John Williams called the removal of 
so-called “criminal aliens” the least controversial of any immigration policy.249 
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This type of conventional wisdom has, by extension, legitimated the criminal 
prosecution of those who enter without permission. By moving border crossers 
into the “criminal” category, they are marked as those undeserving of relief.250 
Consider, for example, President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) initiative to regularize the status of children who came to the 
United States through no fault of their own.251 In the same Rose Garden speech 
where President Obama announced DACA, he touted that his administration 
was prioritizing “border security, putting more boots on the southern border 
that at any time in our history.”252 Criminal immigration prosecutions remained 
at historic highs,253 underscoring the administration’s comfort with a good-bad 
immigrant narrative that promoted some immigrants for legalization while in-
carcerating others for seeking to enter.254 By doubling down on enforcement 
against those with criminal records, the Obama administration built “credibil-
ity in the push for comprehensive immigration reform.”255 
Similar patterns of compromise are present elsewhere in immigration law. 
As Rachel Rosenbloom has identified, over the past few decades deportation 
relief for immigrant victims of crime has proliferated with bipartisan sup-
port.256 At the same time, these victim-focused initiatives have solidified the 
positioning of those convicted of crimes as destined for swift deportation.257 
Guidance on enforcement discretion adopted during the Obama administration 
revealed the same fault line.258 Although the guidance was promoted as pro-
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tecting deserving migrants from enforcement, it ushered in a record high num-
ber of deportations for those deemed undeserving. Illegal entry, along with 
traffic offenses and marijuana possession, were among the common criminal 
offenses that triggered deportation under these civil enforcement priorities.259 
The Trump DOJ’s prosecutions of mothers and vulnerable asylum seekers is 
the latest in this rising tide of constructing migrants as “criminals” and thus 
unworthy of lawful entry into the United States.260 
The dramatic shift to a decriminalization stance took the national stage in 
the summer of 2019 when Democratic presidential candidate Julián Castro 
challenged all Democratic candidates to support the repeal of Section 1325. As 
he put it, the United States should “go back to the way we used to treat this” by 
regarding illegal entry as a civil violation.261 Congressman Beto O’Rourke re-
sponded to Castro with a more modest proposal that relied on prosecutorial 
discretion, rather than legislative reform. According to O’Rourke, prosecutors 
should simply refrain from charging “any family who was fleeing violence and 
persecution.”262 But, Castro shot back, critiquing O’Rourke’s prosecutorial 
discretion approach as ignoring the reality that the Trump administration is 
“using section 1325 of that Act . . . to incarcerate the parents and then separate 
them.”263 “Your policy would still criminalize a lot of these families, your poli-
cy would still criminalize them because it does not call for the repeal of Sec-
tion 1325.”264 For Castro, “if you truly want to change the system,” it is neces-
sary to “repeal that section.”265 
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During and following the opening debate, other leading Democratic can-
didates agreed with Castro’s policy proposal to decriminalize border crossing. 
Congressman Cory Booker spoke out in favor on the debate stage, agreeing 
that “we have the power to better deal with this problem through the civil pro-
cess than the criminal process.”266 Senator Elizabeth Warren similarly support-
ed ending criminal prosecutions for illegal entry, so as to refocus “limited re-
sources on actual criminals and real threats to the United States.”267 Senators 
Kirsten Gillibrand and Kamala Harris also both agreed border crossing should 
be reduced to a civil violation.268 
This emerging consensus among many Democratic politicians closely 
tracks public opinion polls. The majority of Americans now oppose the way 
that Section 1325 is being used. For example, 62% of those surveyed by CNN 
in 2019 disapproved of “the way migrants attempting to cross the U.S. border 
are being treated by the U.S. government[.]”269 Moreover, 60% favored allow-
ing refugees from Central American countries to seek asylum in the United 
States.270 A 2018 CNN poll found that 66% of respondents thought that the 
                                                                                                                           
This provision has allowed for separation of children and families at our border, the 
large scale detention of tens of thousands of families, and has deterred migrants from 
turning themselves in to an immigration official within our borders. The widespread de-
tention of these individuals and families at our border has overburdened our justice sys-
tem, been ineffective at deterring migration, and has cost our government billions of 
dollars. 
Julián Castro, People First Immigration, JULIÁN CASTRO (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.julianforthe
future.com/news-events/people-first-immigration/?source=medium [https://perma.cc/2BDQ-UWYX]. 
 266 Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debates, Night 1, supra note 16; see also Kevin Uhr-
macher et al., Where 2020 Democrats Stand on Immigration, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/immigration/ [https://perma.cc/J9H9-DHMY] 
(quoting U.S. Senator Cory Booker explaining that he supports civil penalties for those who cross the 
border illegally, but opposes criminal prosecution). 
 267 Elizabeth Warren, A Fair and Welcoming Immigration System, MEDIUM (July 11, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/a-fair-and-welcoming-immigration-system-8fff69cd674e [https://
perma.cc/CTF7-S5K5] (“We should repeal this criminal prohibition to prevent future abuse.”). 
 268 Democratic Debate Transcript: July 31, 2019, NBC NEWS (July 31, 2019), https://www.nbc
news.com/politics/2020-election/democratic-debate-transcript-july-31-2019-n1038016 [https://perma.
cc/BX7W-S53X] [hereinafter Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debates, Night 2] (quoting 
U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand arguing that because the “law on the books” can “be so misused,” 
border crossing “should be a civil violation and we should make sure that we treat people humanely”); 
Susan Jones, Kamala Harris: No Jail for Illegal Border Crossers, ‘But I Believe in Border Security,’ 
CNSNEWS.COM (July 16, 2019), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/Article/susan-jones/kamala-harris-
no-jail-illegal-border-crossers-i-believe-border-security [https://perma.cc/6XCV-NZK7] (quoting U.S. 
Senator Kamala Harris stating her view that border crossing should be “a civil enforcement issue, but 
not a criminal one”). 
 269 Immigration/Border Security, POLLINGREPORT.COM, https://www.pollingreport.com/immig-
ration.htm [https://perma.cc/532K-PXRZ] (citing a CNN poll conducted by SSRS on 1,613 adults 
nationwide on June 28–30, 2019). 
 270 Id. 
2020] The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing 2017 
United States “should do everything it can” to keep families crossing the bor-
der illegally together, “even if it means that fewer face criminal prosecu-
tion.”271 Another voter survey taken in 2019 found that 65% of all respondents 
(and 92% of Democrats) believed separating families was “unacceptable.”272 
Senator Bernie Sanders and Democratic Presidential nominee Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden have not, however, followed other Democrats in calling for re-
peal. Sanders has explained that he supports ending Operation Streamline and 
returning to a system that handles nearly all border crossings as civil viola-
tions, but he believes that criminal prosecutions should remain a tool for “secu-
rity threats and extenuating circumstances.”273 In Biden’s view, the problem is 
not the existence of the border crossing law on the books, but rather how the 
law is being used by the Trump administration.274 Biden’s immigration plat-
form envisions a return to exercising prosecutorial discretion, including re-
fraining from prosecuting parents and asylum seekers for “minor immigration 
violations as an intimidation tactic.”275 
Castro’s groundbreaking proposal only included repeal of illegal entry 
under Section 1325. Section 1326, which was part of the same initial Undesir-
able Aliens Act first adopted in 1929,276 was not discussed on the debate stage. 
Illegal reentry prosecutions also swelled through 2019,277 but they have not 
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achievement. William P. Barr, Attorney Gen., Opening Statement Before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/speech/opening-statement-attorney-general-william-p-barr-house-appropriations-
subcommittee [https://perma.cc/Y2YY-NXTB]. 
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garnered as much national attention as the zero-tolerance prosecutions of first-
time border crossers under Section 1325. Democratic politicians may consider 
repealing Section 1326 to be a riskier political proposition. Since 2006 the 
number of Americans who think it is extremely important to control the border 
“to halt the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.” has remained relatively 
constant, between forty-two and fifty-three percent.278 
The New Way Forward Act proposed by Democratic members of Con-
gress at the end of 2019 takes the bold step of repealing both Section 1325 (il-
legal entry) and Section 1326 (illegal reentry). The bill was sponsored by Rep-
resentative Jesús García of Illinois, as well as forty-three other members of 
Congress, and supported by over 145 advocacy organizations and community 
representatives.279 As Congressman García noted on the House floor when in-
troducing the bill: “We must end the labels of the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ immi-
grant used to dehumanize and divide communities. At this moment in history, 
we are called to uphold our values of compassion, common humanity, and ra-
cial justice.”280 Critiquing the growing number of federal immigration crime 
prosecutions over the past two decades, supporters of the bill explain that such 
prosecutions have “fueled mass incarceration despite growing consensus that it 
must end.”281 They call for ending the “assembly-line” style hearings, the sepa-
ration of families at the border, and the application of “extra punishment” to 
those in the immigration system.282 
If Sections 1325 and 1326 were both repealed, crossing the border with-
out permission would no longer be a crime.283 Ending these illegal entry crimes 
would necessarily stop the prosecution of first-time border crossers who have 
clogged magistrate courts and endured painful separation from their families. 
Ending illegal reentry prosecutions would also mend the harm from the grow-
ing incarceration of Latinx migrants who return to the United States after prior 
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deportations to reunite with family or to seek refuge.284 Moreover, decriminali-
zation would restructure the role of federal prosecutors and free up their dock-
ets to pursue more serious crimes, such as drug smuggling and gun crimes. 
Federal magistrate judges could return to the other important work of the fed-
eral bench and abandon the diluted application of federal procedural norms 
that has come to characterize the mass Streamline proceedings. 
Although much of criminal law’s development can rightly be character-
ized as a “one-way ratchet” of expanding severity,285 decriminalization is also 
part of the story. As Darryl Brown’s work underscores, “when majority prefer-
ences change about conduct that is criminalized, legislatures often find their 
way to repealing such provisions.”286 In the case of border crossing, the 
#NewWayForward platform to #DecriminalizeMigration has garnered consid-
erable approval from some Democratic voters. A 2019 poll by NPR and PBS 
found that forty-five percent of Democrats thought decriminalizing border 
crossing was a good idea.287  
Support for decriminalization follows in the footsteps of the demand by 
many immigrant rights groups to abolish Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE), the interior enforcement arm of DHS.288 The campaign to #Abol-
ishICE swiftly gained endorsements of major nonprofit organizations289 and 
became the centerpiece of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s sensational ouster of 
Joe Crowley, the Democratic congressional incumbent in New York.290 Con-
gresswoman Ocasio-Cortez’s unexpected victory solidified that a platform 
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built on abolition of current immigration enforcement systems can draw public 
support, at least in Democratic strongholds. Reflecting growing momentum for 
the “abolish ICE” concept, in 2018 a bill was introduced in Congress to end 
the agency and establish a bipartisan commission to create a more humane 
immigration enforcement system.291 
At the same time, voters in the United States do remain deeply divided 
along party lines regarding immigration enforcement. While 75% of registered 
Republicans said illegal migration was a very big problem, only 19% of Dem-
ocrats agreed.292 Those who favor stronger border enforcement oppose repeal-
ing the criminal immigration laws.293 They contend that removing the criminal 
sanction from irregular migration would result in so-called “open borders.”294 
Indeed, after several Democrats came forward in the presidential debates to 
endorse decriminalizing border crossing, President Trump’s campaign manager 
tweeted: “Now Democrats are for OPEN BORDERS! These debates are great, 
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the American people can now see how far left the candidates are.”295 Immigra-
tion scholar Peter Schuck warned readers of The New York Times that Demo-
crats have “invite[d these] charges that they favor ‘open borders’” by failing to 
endorse firm policies for immigration enforcement.296 
Supporters of continued criminal enforcement argue that criminal sanc-
tions are necessary to punish and deter illegal migration and to protect the law-
ful system for immigration from political attack.297 Conventional immigration 
law scholarship has for a long time assumed that criminal sanctions are neces-
sary to “deter moral hazard” in cases where removal alone is not “an adequate 
remedy.”298 Prosecuting irregular border crossers, as Professor Kit Johnson 
points out, has an important “signaling effect” in that it sends a clear message 
that unlawful border crossing will not be tolerated.299 These arguments are par-
ticularly applicable in the context of repeat border crossers. 
Others have characterized the deterrence rationale as deeply problematic. 
As K-Sue Park warns, the “commitment to spectacle” surrounding border 
crime prosecutions is “clearly and openly intend[ed] to harness the indirect 
effects of direct enforcement” by terrorizing immigrant communities living in 
the United States so that they “self-deport.”300 Eisha Jain similarly cautions 
that the deterrence rationale put forth by the administration imposes “systemic 
costs” that have been under-appreciated.301 The painful forced separations of 
families inflicted as part of a prosecution policy is one of the most graphic ex-
amples of these human costs. Removing the tool of criminal prosecution for 
border crossing would prevent this harmful use of low-level prosecutions.302 It 
would also, as Stephen Lee’s work underscores, help to insulate federal prose-
cutors from serving as the “gatekeeper” to removal.303 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Brad Parscale (@parscale), TWITTER (June 26, 2019, 6:46 PM), https://twitter.com/parscale/
status/1144059402628075520 [https://perma.cc/6AWY-F6BX]. 
 296 Peter H. Schuck, Opinion, On Immigration, the Democrats Are Playing into Trump’s Hands, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/opinion/on-immigration-the-
democrats-are-playing-into-trumps-hands.html [https://perma.cc/GH8V-DJYJ]. 
 297 Martin, supra note 221, at 412–21 (providing examples of “how widespread and visible fail-
ures of immigration enforcement, especially when they lead to rapidly rising populations of unauthor-
ized migrants in local communities throughout the nation, create momentum for new restrictive legis-
lation”). 
 298 Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 298–
99 (2013). 
 299 Johnson, supra note 13, at 870–71. 
 300 Park, supra note 7, at 1929. 
 301 Jain, supra note 7, at 1467–68 (elucidating why the Trump administration’s “theory of deter-
rence is oversimplified”). 
 302 For additional development of the ways in which overcriminalization causes harm, see Eisha 
Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1281, 1281–88 (2018). 
 303 Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 553 (2013). 
2022 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1967 
Even if Sections 1325 and 1326 were to remain in place, future reform ef-
forts could focus on creating guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion, 
along the lines advocated by Professor Fan.304 Such guidelines could counsel 
prosecutors to forego prosecuting persons who arrive with young children or 
who enter the United States to seek asylum.305 Guidelines could also advise 
prosecutors to refrain from low-level border prosecutions altogether, in favor 
of other, more serious crimes. One important example of a federal policy of 
prosecutorial discretion is that of the Obama administration to not prosecute 
low-level marijuana violations.306 Citing “limited investigative and prosecuto-
rial resources,” the DOJ policy made clear that federal prosecutors would in-
stead focus on offenses such as interstate trafficking of marijuana and cartel 
and gang activity.307 A future border enforcement policy could follow this 
model, providing some level of reassurance as to how limited enforcement 
budgets will be allocated along the border. 
Another refinement that could be advanced is a reduction in the maxi-
mum sentence for border crossing.308 Violations of Section 1325 can garner up 
to six months, while the statutory maximum for Section 1326 is currently 
twenty years for those who reenter after a criminal conviction and ten years for 
those without a criminal record.309 Federal judges have already rejected such 
lengthy sentences in their day-to-day practice of sentencing 1325 and 1326 
defendants. While most illegal entry defendants receive sentences of time 
served,310 the median sentence for illegal reentry in federal courts is now only 
six months.311 Short of repeal, reducing the statutory maximums would reflect 
the collective judgment of federal judges who evaluate these cases and help to 
ensure that judges in the future are restrained within a narrower range. Even 
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with a reduced statutory maximum, the DOJ could still encourage its prosecu-
tors to seek minimal sentences, including probation, for border crossing.312 
C. Rethinking Civil Immigration Law 
What might the civil immigration law look like if Sections 1325 and 1326 
were successfully excised from the criminal code? Although border crimes 
may not be abolished in the short term, thinking in abolitionist terms helps to 
provoke deeper inquiry into alternative structures for the immigration sys-
tem.313 This last Section aims to clarify what would change if Sections 1325 
and 1326 were repealed and also to identify some ways in which the civil im-
migration law, if decoupled from its criminal counterpart, might be further re-
vised to better regulate the complexity of issues that occur at the border. 
In the absence of laws criminalizing illegal entry and reentry, irregular 
migration would not become lawful. Instead, it would remain a civil violation 
of the immigration law.314 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, unlaw-
ful entry is subject to a civil fine of up to $250.315 Entering the United States 
without permission also makes individuals inadmissible.316 Unauthorized entry 
can also subject migrants to a quick administrative removal process that does 
not include a hearing before an immigration judge known as “expedited re-
moval.”317 None of this would change with the repeal of the criminal penalties 
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contained in Sections 1325 and 1326. Nor would current proposals to decrimi-
nalize border crossing make federal immigration law entirely civil. Other fed-
eral immigration crimes would remain, such as bringing in or harboring aliens 
and fraudulent use of immigration documents.318 
For skeptics concerned about the abandonment of criminal sanctions for 
border crossing, an important question to consider is whether the civil immi-
gration system could dispense graduated civil sanctions akin to those the crim-
inal system now offers. For example, first-time entrants generally only receive 
time served sentences,319 but sentences do become more severe with successive 
entries.320 Could the civil immigration system incorporate a similar kind of 
graduated structure? 
The prevalence of prosecutions for border crossings has overshadowed 
the fact that the current civil system does already have some flexibility in 
terms of how the administrative sanction of deportation is meted out. For ex-
ample, at the least severe end of the spectrum, an immigration judge may allow 
some individuals to leave “voluntarily.” Voluntary departure allows the noncit-
izen to avoid certain harsh consequences of a judge-issued removal order, such 
as bars to lawful readmission.321 In addition to voluntary departure, there is a 
somewhat graduated structure for deportation. Depending on the reason for 
exclusion, a noncitizen may be permanently barred from being readmitted to 
the United States, or barred for shorter periods of five, ten, or twenty years.322 
Importantly, decriminalizing border crossing could encourage exploration 
of a wider range of types of deportation, including the addition of mechanisms 
that fall short of deportation. Immigration scholar Adam Cox has argued that 
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deportation law could be revised to include a “temporary deportation rule.”323 
Temporary deportation could give the noncitizen the right to reenter the United 
States after a set period of time, such as a year. Other conditions could be at-
tached, similar to those used in the criminal system for probation. For example, 
a noncitizen deported after a drug conviction could be required to provide 
proof of successful completion of a rehabilitative program prior to applying for 
readmission.324 
Building on Cox’s idea of temporary deportation, Professor Michael 
Wishnie has described a number of ways that the severity of sanctions in re-
moval cases could be varied. For instance, in lieu of deportation, immigration 
judges could be allowed to give a warning or a suspended sentence of deporta-
tion.325 Civil fines could also be further developed.326 In lieu of deportation, 
Juliet Stumpf has proposed another form of graduated sanction: allowing im-
migration judges to delay privileges, such as by requiring a longer time period 
before a lawful permanent resident becomes eligible for citizenship, or before 
an undocumented migrant becomes eligible for lawful permanent residence.327 
And, as Dan Kanstroom has noted, judges could be given the discretion to dis-
pense these lesser sanctions to certain groups of individuals, such as children 
or those who come to the United States seeking asylum.328 The basic takeaway 
here is that, by borrowing from the graduated system for sanctions in the crim-
inal justice system, policymakers could design a broader menu of options that 
would include intermediate sanctions short of deportation.329 
Another concept that could be borrowed from the criminal justice system 
is that of a statute of limitations. For example, both the illegal entry and 
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reentry statutes are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.330 Research by 
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez has clarified that civil deportation rules 
used to be subject to statutes of limitations.331 Few grounds for removal, how-
ever, have retained a time bar.332 The New Way Forward Act recently intro-
duced in the House would adopt a five-year statute of limitations for civil re-
moval proceedings.333 If adopted, the government would have a five-year 
deadline for pursuing grounds of deportability and inadmissibility.334 Reviving 
the concept of statute of limitations in this way would protect noncitizens from 
ongoing exposure to the constant threat of deportation. For example, under 
such a change, deportations for old criminal convictions could be time 
barred.335 Doing so would help to promote finality and clarity in immigration 
status, as well as a clear path to citizenship. 
Another modest proposal for reviving the time bar concept would be to 
update the registry date under the Registry Act of 1929, which currently only 
provides a path to lawful status for individuals who have been present in the 
United States since January 1, 1972.336 As Donald Kerwin and Robert Warren 
have argued, the registry system is sorely out of date: a simple fix would be to 
allow legalization for those who have been present in the United States for a 
set term of years.337 
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Severed from the criminal law, immigration law could also be refined to 
incorporate the concept of mercy. In his trailblazing memoir which was recent-
ly made into a feature film, Alabama Equal Justice Initiative founder Bryan 
Stevenson argues in favor of shifting the criminal justice paradigm to embrace 
mercy.338 Stevenson pushes his readers to think of “justice” as requiring mercy, 
which he explains requires treating individuals with human dignity and appre-
ciating the holistic set of circumstances that the individual confronts.339 In the 
context of criminal sentencing, practicing mercy requires abandoning manda-
tory sentencing regimes in favor of a system in which judges take into account 
personal background and context in order to reach a just sentencing outcome. 
In the immigration context, as Allison Tirres has shown, mercy would mean 
moving away from bright-line removal rules and instead evaluating individual-
ized factors before making the threshold decision on whether someone is sub-
ject to removal.340 Immigration judges, like sentencing judges, could engage in 
a more nuanced balancing test that would weigh the severity of any conduct as 
well as the stake that the noncitizen has in the country.341 Rather than treating 
removal as a certain sanction, a shift toward mercy would make the outcome 
context specific. 
Restructuring the civil sanction of deportation to incorporate mercy—and 
making removal time-limited and graduated—are important insights that are 
brought into sharper relief by the movement to decriminalize border crossing. 
Removing the shadow of criminal prosecution would also open the door to 
related reforms to expand the availability of relief from deportation.342 Over 
time, eligibility for relief has become exceedingly constrained.343 As this Arti-
cle has shown, the current administration has sought to chip away even further 
at even the most basic forms of relief that remain, such as asylum. Thinking of 
the immigration system as one that is purely civil, rather than divided across 
civil and criminal courts, welcomes consideration of whether immigration 
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judges should be given wider discretion in going about their work. There is 
precedent in earlier versions of the immigration law for giving judges more 
latitude to weigh equities in granting relief from removal. For example, under 
the former Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, judges 
could weigh discretionary equities to waive the deportation of certain individ-
uals who had lived in the United States for at least seven years.344 Factors such 
as military service, family ties in the United States, and evidence of value and 
service to the community were among the factors that judges considered in 
deciding whether to grant this form of relief.345 The current system for cancel-
lation of removal,346 as Jill Family has persuasively shown, is far narrower.347 
Reviving 212(c), and creating other similar discretionary relief mechanisms, 
would help to bring discretion and forgiveness back into the immigration law. 
In conclusion, growing support for a fundamental rethinking of the crimi-
nal immigration law and its prosecution system opens new possibilities for 
imagining the civil immigration system. Two aspects of removal decisions are 
particularly ripe for review: greater discretion could be embedded into the 
threshold decision of whether someone is subject to removal, and relief from 
removal could be broadened. In addition, as this Section has developed, depor-
tation itself could be scaled to create a wider range of civil remedies, including 
by offering warnings, temporary deportation, or instituting a statute of limita-
tions. Doing so would empower decisionmakers to weigh the individual cir-
cumstances and equities of every case. 
CONCLUSION 
Although immigration crime has been a central feature of the federal 
criminal system for decades, few questioned the propriety of these prosecu-
tions. The current moment has unveiled problematic border prosecution prac-
tices and spurred intensive critique. Among Democrats, the discussion about 
border enforcement has shifted from a predictable one about the proper exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion to one that questions the appropriateness of 
criminalizing migration in the first place. Issues now being debated on the na-
                                                                                                                           
 344 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)) (repealed 1997). For additional background on the 
development and 1997 repeal of Section 212(c), see Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the 
Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 781–801 (1997). 
 345 Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 346 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a) (cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents); 1229b(b) 
(cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents). 
 347 See generally Jill E. Family, The Future Relief of Immigration Law, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 393, 
398–403 (2017). 
2020] The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing 2029 
tional stage concern the ways that these prosecutions threaten other core Amer-
ican values of due process, family unity, and racial justice. 
Repealing the laws that have allowed these prosecutions to proliferate is a 
powerful proposal—and one that this Article has argued also invites rethinking 
of the civil immigration law to ensure that a more just and equitable system is 
in fact achieved. Immigration enforcement will no doubt remain a contested 
and evolving area of immigration policy, and the resolution of the pivotal de-
bates mapped out in this Article remains uncertain. Decision making in Con-
gress and courts, as well as in the minds of the public, will be central to how—
indeed, whether—the criminal justice system will continue to manage migra-
tion. 
  
 
